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ABSTRACT
THRESHOLD CRYPTOGRAPHY WITH CHINESE
REMAINDER THEOREM
Kamer Kaya
Ph.D. in Computer Engineering
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Ali Aydın Selc¸uk
August, 2009
Information security has become much more important since electronic communi-
cation is started to be used in our daily life. The content of the term information
security varies according to the type and the requirements of the area. However,
no matter which algorithms are used, security depends on the secrecy of a key
which is supposed to be only known by the agents in the first place.
The requirement of the key being secret brings several problems. Storing
a secret key on only one person, server or database reduces the security of the
system to the security and credibility of that agent. Besides, not having a backup
of the key introduces the problem of losing the key if a software/hardware failure
occurs. On the other hand, if the key is held by more than one agent an adversary
with a desire for the key has more flexibility of choosing the target. Hence the
security is reduced to the security of the least secure or least credible of these
agents.
Secret sharing schemes are introduced to solve the problems above. The main
idea of these schemes is to share the secret among the agents such that only
predefined coalitions can come together and reveal the secret, while no other
coalition can obtain any information about the secret. Thus, the keys used in the
areas requiring vital secrecy like large-scale finance applications and command-
control mechanisms of nuclear systems, can be stored by using secret sharing
schemes.
Threshold cryptography deals with a particular type of secret sharing schemes.
In threshold cryptography related secret sharing schemes, if the size of a coalition
exceeds a bound t, it can reveal the key. And, smaller coalitions can reveal no in-
formation about the key. Actually, the first secret sharing scheme in the literature
is the threshold scheme of Shamir where he considered the secret as the constant
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vof a polynomial of degree t− 1, and distributed the points on the polynomial to
the group of users. Thus, a coalition of size t can recover the polynomial and
reveal the key but a smaller coalition can not. This scheme is widely accepted by
the researchers and used in several applications. Shamir’s secret sharing scheme
is not the only one in the literature. For example, almost concurrently, Blak-
ley proposed another secret sharing scheme depending on planar geometry and
Asmuth and Bloom proposed a scheme depending on the Chinese Remainder
Theorem. Although these schemes satisfy the necessary and sufficient conditions
for the security, they have not been considered for the applications requiring a
secret sharing scheme.
Secret sharing schemes constituted a building block in several other applica-
tions other than the ones mentioned above. These applications simply contain a
standard problem in the literature, the function sharing problem. In a function
sharing scheme, each user has its own secret as an input to a function and the
scheme computes the outcome of the function without revealing the secrets. In
the literature, encryption or signature functions of the public key algorithms like
RSA, ElGamal and Paillier can be given as an example to the functions shared by
using a secret sharing scheme. Even new generation applications like electronic
voting require a function sharing scheme.
As mentioned before, Shamir’s secret sharing scheme has attracted much of the
attention in the literature and other schemes are not considered much. However,
as this thesis shows, secret sharing schemes depending on the Chinese Remainder
Theorem can be practically used in these applications. Since each application has
different needs, Shamir’s secret sharing scheme is used in applications with several
extensions. Basically, this thesis investigates how to adapt Chinese Remainder
Theorem based secret sharing schemes to the applications in the literature. We
first propose some modifications on the Asmuth-Bloom secret sharing scheme and
then by using this modified scheme we designed provably secure function sharing
schemes and security extensions.
Keywords: Threshold cryptography, secret sharing, function sharing, Asmuth-
Bloom, Chinese Remainder Theorem, provable security.
O¨ZET
C¸I˙N KALAN TEOREMI˙’NE DAYALI ES¸I˙K
KRI˙PTOGRAFI˙SI˙
Kamer Kaya
Bilgisayar Mu¨hendislig˘i, Doktora
Tez Yo¨neticisi: Asst. Prof. Dr. Ali Aydın Selc¸uk
Ag˘ustos 2009
Bilgi gu¨venlig˘i, elektronik iletis¸imin hayatımızın her alanına girmesi ile birlikte
giderek daha c¸ok o¨nemli hale gelmektedir. Bilgi gu¨venlig˘i kavramının ic¸erig˘i kul-
lanıldıg˘ı uygulamanın c¸es¸idine ve gereksinimlerine go¨re deg˘is¸ebilmektedir. Fakat
kullanılan alan ya da uygulama ne olursa olsun, gu¨venlik ic¸in hangi algorit-
malar kullanılırsa kullanılsın, gu¨venlik ilk o¨nce gerekli kis¸ilerin bilmesi gereken
bir anahtarın gizli kalmasına dayanmaktadır.
Gu¨venlig˘in en o¨nemli unsuru olan anahtarların gizli kalması ve kaybolma-
ması gereksinimleri deg˘is¸ik problemleri de beraberinde getirmektedir. Anahtarın
sadece bir kis¸ide, sunucuda ya da veritabanında saklanması, sistemin gu¨venlig˘ini
o kis¸inin gu¨venlig˘ine ve gu¨venilirlig˘ine indirgemektedir. Bunun yanında s¸ifrenin
bas¸ka bir kopyasının olmaması da yazılım/donanım arızaları gibi durumlarda
anahtarın tamamen kaybedilmesi gibi sakıncalar ic¸ermektedir. Anahtarın bir-
den fazla kis¸ide bulunması durumunda ise anahtarı ele gec¸irmeye c¸alıs¸an biri ic¸in
artık bir deg˘il birden fazla hedef vardır ve dolayısıyla, anahtarın gu¨venlig˘i bu
kis¸ilerinin en az gu¨venlig˘e sahip olanının gu¨venlig˘ine indirgenmektedir.
Anahtar paylas¸tırma yo¨ntemleri ilk olarak yukarıda bahsedilen problemleri
c¸o¨zmek ic¸in o¨nerilmis¸tir. Bu yo¨ntemlerdeki ana fikir anahtarın belli bir grup
ic¸inde o¨yle paylas¸tırılmasıdır ki, sadece o¨nceden belirlenen koalisyonlar bir araya
geldig˘inde anahtarı elde edebilmeli daha ku¨c¸u¨k koalisyonlar ise anahtar hakkında
hic¸bir bilgi elde edememelidir. Bu sayede, s¸irketlerin karar mekanizması uygu-
lamaları, bu¨yu¨k o¨lc¸ekli finans uygulamaları, nu¨kleer sistemlerin komuta-kontrol
uygulamaları gibi alanlarda gizli kalması gereken anahtarlar anahtar paylas¸tırma
yo¨ntemleri kullanılarak saklanabilir.
Es¸ik kriptografisi anahtar paylas¸tırma yo¨ntemlerinin o¨zel bir hali ile ilgilenir.
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Es¸ik kriptografisine dayanan anahtar paylas¸tırma yo¨ntemlerinde bir koalisyonun
ic¸indeki kis¸i sayısı, bu¨yu¨klu¨g˘u¨, belli bir es¸ig˘i, kısaca t, gec¸iyorsa, o koalisyon
anahtarı elde edebilir. Daha ku¨c¸u¨k koalisyonlar ise anahtar hakkında hic¸ bir bilgi
elde edemezler. Literatu¨rde ilk o¨nerilen anahtar paylas¸tıma yo¨ntemlerinden biri
Shamir’in es¸ik kriptografisine dayanan yo¨ntemidir. Shamir bu yo¨ntemde anahtarı
t-1 dereceli bir polinomun sabit terimi olarak du¨s¸u¨nmu¨s¸ ve polinomun gec¸tig˘i nok-
taları grup ic¸inde dag˘ıtmıs¸tır. Bu sayede, gerekli oldug˘unda t bu¨yu¨klu¨g˘u¨ndeki
bir koalisyon, polinomu yaratarak anahtarı elde edebilir. Bu yo¨ntem sonraları
gu¨venlik u¨zerine aras¸tırma yapan bilim insanları tarafından kabul go¨rmu¨s¸ ve
deg˘is¸ik uygulamalarda kullanılmıs¸tır. Bu yo¨ntem ile yaklas¸ık aynı zamanlarda
o¨nerilen Blakley’in du¨zlem geometrisine dayalı anahtar paylas¸tırma yo¨ntemi ve
Asmuth ve Bloom’un o¨nerdig˘i C¸in Kalan Teoremi@ne dayalı yo¨ntem gu¨venlik
ac¸ısından gerekli ve yeterli s¸artları sag˘ladıkları halde aras¸tırmacılar tarafından
rag˘bet go¨rmemis¸lerdir.
Anahtar paylas¸tırma yo¨ntemleri yukarıda bahsedilen uygulamalar dıs¸ında da
deg˘is¸ik gu¨venlik uygulamaları ic¸in temel yapı parc¸acıg˘ı go¨revini go¨rmu¨s¸lerdir.
Bu uygulamalar, genelde fonksiyon paylas¸tırma yo¨ntemi olarak bilinen, her-
hangi bir fonksiyonun c¸ıktısının, herbiri gizli bir fonksiyon girdisine sahip bir
grup tarafından, fonksiyon girdileri gizli kalmak s¸artı ile hesaplanması problemini
ic¸erir. Literatu¨rde, anahtar paylas¸tırma yo¨ntemleri temel alınarak paylas¸tırılan
bu fonksiyonlara RSA, ElGamal ve Paillier gibi ac¸ık anahtar algoritmalarının
imza yada s¸ifreleme fonksiyonları o¨rnek go¨sterilebilir. Elektronik sec¸im gibi yeni
nesil uygulamalar fonksiyon paylas¸tırma yo¨ntemlerini yog˘un bir s¸ekilde kullan-
maktadır.
Daha o¨nce de bahsedildig˘i gibi, Shamir’in anahtar paylas¸tırma yo¨ntemi lit-
eratu¨rde sıklıkla kullanılan bir yo¨ntem olup dig˘er anahtar paylas¸tırma sistemleri
pek rag˘bet go¨rmemektedir. Fakat, bu tezin go¨sterdig˘i gibi C¸in Kalan Teoremine
dayalı anahtar paylas¸tırma yo¨ntemleri de pratik olarak bu tu¨r uygulamalarda
kullanılabilir. Her uygulama deg˘is¸ik gu¨venlik gereksinimlerine sahip oldug˘u
ic¸in, Shamir’in yo¨ntemi deg˘is¸ik eklentiler tasarlanarak c¸es¸itli uygulamalarda kul-
lanılmıs¸tır. Bu tez temel olarak farklı anahtar paylas¸tırma yo¨ntemlerinin c¸es¸itli
uygulamalarda nasıl kullanabileceg˘i u¨zerine yog˘unlas¸acaktır. Tezde C¸in Kalan
Teoremi’ne dayalı bir anahtar paylas¸tırma yo¨ntemi olan Asmuth-Bloom yo¨ntemi
ic¸in bazı deg˘is¸iklikler o¨nerilecektir. Sonra da bu yeni yo¨ntemler kullanılarak
kanıtlanabilir gu¨venlig˘e sahip fonksiyon paylas¸tırma yo¨ntemleri ve halihazırda
viii
varolan uygulamalarda gereken deg˘is¸ik gu¨venlik eklentileri tasarlanacaktır.
Anahtar so¨zcu¨kler : Es¸ik kriptografisi, anahtar paylas¸tırma, fonksiyon
paylas¸tırma, Asmuth-Bloom, C¸in Kalan Teoremi, kanıtlanabilir gu¨venlik.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In his seminal paper [67], Shamir quoted the following combinatorial problem:
Eleven scientists are working on a secret project. They wish to lock up the
documents in a cabinet so that the cabinet can be opened if and only if six or
more of the scientists are present. What is the smallest number of locks needed?
What is the smallest number of keys to the locks each scientist must carry?
A simple combinatorial approach needs (11, 6) = 462 locks and (10, 5) = 252
for each scientist. Even if we could manufacture such a cabinet, what would we
do if we had 111 or 1111 scientists? In cryptography, we have a similar prob-
lem called secret sharing. When a confidential information is cryptographically
secured, a secret called the key is needed to access this information. Giving this
key to only one person is not a good idea since he can lose the key and the infor-
mation can be inaccessible. To solve this problem, the key can be shared among
several people. Since the above combinatorial approach is not efficient and not
practical, we need a secret sharing scheme to distribute the key among n people.
Fortunately, threshold cryptography deals with the problem of sharing a highly
sensitive secret among a group of n users so that only when a sufficient num-
ber t of them come together can the secret be reconstructed. Well-known secret
sharing schemes (SSS) in the literature include Shamir [67] based on polynomial
interpolation, Blakley [9] based on hyperplane geometry, and Asmuth-Bloom [2]
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based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem.
A further requirement of a threshold cryptosystem can be that the subject
function (e.g., a digital signature) should be computable without the involved par-
ties disclosing their secret shares. This is known as the function sharing problem.
A function sharing scheme (FSS) requires distributing the function’s computa-
tion according to the underlying SSS such that each part of the computation can
be carried out by a different user and then the partial results can be combined
to yield the function’s value without disclosing the individual secrets. Several
protocols for function sharing [21, 22, 23, 24, 66, 68] have been proposed in the
literature.
1.1 Secret Sharing Schemes
The problem of secret sharing and the first solutions were introduced indepen-
dently by Shamir [67] and Blakley [9] in 1979. A (t, n)-secret sharing scheme is
used to distribute a secret d among n people such that any coalition of size t or
more can construct d but smaller coalitions cannot.
The first scheme for sharing a secret was proposed by Shamir [67] based on
polynomial interpolation. To obtain a (t, n) secret sharing, a random polynomial
f(x) = at−1xt−1 + at−2xt−2 + . . . + a0 is generated over Zp[x] where p is a prime
number and a0 = d is the secret. The share of the ith party is yi = f(i), 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
If t or more parties come together, they can construct the polynomial by Lagrange
interpolation and obtain the secret, but any smaller coalitions cannot.
Another interesting SSS is the scheme proposed by Blakley [9]. In a t dimen-
sional space, a system of t non-parallel, non-degenerate hyperplanes intersect at a
single point. In Blakley’s scheme, a point in the t dimensional space (or, its first
coordinate) is taken as the secret and each party is given a hyperplane passing
through that point. When t users come together, they can uniquely identify the
secret point, but smaller coalitions cannot.
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A fundamentally different SSS is the scheme of Asmuth and Bloom [2], which
shares a secret among the parties using modular arithmetic and reconstructs it
by the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT).
1.1.1 Extensions on Threshold Secret Sharing Schemes
In the original secret sharing problem, we were trying to find a way that makes
the secret available to sufficiently large coalitions. Hence, for security analysis,
we allow an adversary to corrupt less than t users but no more. In this model,
we assume that the adversary is honest but curious and he/she is not allowed
to deviate from the protocol by impersonating a corrupted user. The secret
sharing schemes above, described in their simplest forms, are secure under this
adversary model. However, they do not have a false share detection mechanism
if the adversary sends wrong shares in the reconstruction phase on behalf of a
corrupted user. Furthermore, the adversary can also corrupt the dealer and in
that case the users must check if their shares are consistent with the secret. This
problem was proposed by Chor et al. in 1985 and with a verifiable secret sharing
scheme (VSS) as the solution [17]. Formally, a VSS scheme provides mechanisms
to users to verify their shares are consistent. Furthermore, in a VSS scheme,
even if the dealer is corrupted, there is a well-defined secret that a valid coalition
can reconstruct. After Chor et al., more efficient non-interactive verifiable secret
sharing schemes were proposed by Feldman [27] and [59]. The security of the
Feldman’s scheme depends on the hardness of the discrete-logarithm problem
whereas the Pedersen’s scheme is information theoretically secure.
A further extension to verifiability is public verifiability. In a publicly verifiable
secret sharing (PVSS) scheme, anyone, not only the users, can verify that the
shares are consistent with each other. This property is included in Chor et al.’s
scheme, which is the first VSS in the literature. However, both Feldman’s and
Pedersen’s schemes do not satisfy public verifiability. In [69], Stadler introduced
the PVSS enhancement and proposed two PVSS schemes where the security of
the first one depends on the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption, which
we describe in Section 4.3. Other researchers also investigated the verifiability
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extension such as [7, 28, 32, 64]
As described above, the secrecy of the key is guaranteed if the adversary is
restricted to compromise less than t users throughout the entire life-time of the
secret. If the secret key is valid for a long period of time, which is sufficient
for t corruptions, a secret sharing scheme cannot protect the secret key. In [39],
Herzberg et al. proposed a proactive secret sharing scheme, where the shares of
the users are periodically renewed without changing the long-term secret. After
this renewal operation, the previous shares become obsolete. Hence, in a proactive
secret sharing scheme, an adversary needs to compromise at least t users in a
time period, e.g., a day, a week or a month. Herzberg et al. also described the
mechanisms to guarantee the integrity and the availability of the long-term secret.
These mechanisms provide protocols to detect corrupted shares and recover them
if necessary.
Another extension on SSS schemes is threshold changeability ; with this ex-
tension, the threshold parameter t can be changed after the dealing phase. This
problem was investigated by Martin et al. with the restriction that no secure
channel exists between the dealer and the users [52]. Martin et al. solved two
variations of this problem: when the dealer is available and when he is not. They
proposed two constructions where the first one depends on the Shamir’s SSS and
the second one is geometrical. Later, Steinfeld et al. proposed lattice based
approaches for the same problem: the first approach [70] was designed for CRT-
based SSS schemes and the second approach [71] was designed for Shamir based
SSS schemes.
1.1.2 Properties of Secret Sharing Schemes
A SSS is said to be perfect if coalitions with cardinality smaller than t cannot
obtain any information on d; i.e., the cardinality of the set of secret candidates for
d cannot be reduced by using t− 1 or fewer shares. According to this definition,
the secret sharing schemes described above, Shamir, Blakley and Asmuth-Bloom
SSSs, are perfect SSSs. A stronger definition of perfectness is as follows: in a
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perfect SSS, for an adversary with t − 1 compromised shares, each secret can-
didate has the same probability for being the secret. Shamir’s and Blakley’s
SSSs satisfy this kind of perfectness, however, as described in Section 2.1 and as
Quisquater et al. shows [63], the original Asmuth-Bloom SSS does not satisfy it.
Asmuth and Bloom only showed that when an adversary has t − 1 shares, the
entropy of the secret does not decrease too much [2].
A SSS is said to be ideal if all secrets have the same length as the secret.
Shamir’s and Blakley’s SSSs are ideal secret sharing schemes but Asmuth-Bloom
scheme can only be said almost ideal. Quisquater et al. showed that when the
moduli in Asmuth-Bloom SSS are consecutive primes, the scheme is asymptoti-
cally ideal [63].
1.2 Function Sharing Schemes
In a (t, n) function sharing scheme, a key-dependent function is distributed among
n people such that any coalition of size t or more can evaluate the function but
smaller coalitions cannot. When a coalition S is gathered to evaluate the function,
the ith user in S computes his own partial result by using his share yi and sends
it to the combiner to evaluate the overall result. The combiner must be honest
while combining the partial results but can be curious and try to find the secret
shares. Hence a function sharing scheme cannot reveal the users’ secret shares to
the combiner.
FSSs are typically used to distribute the private key operations in a public
key cryptosystem (i.e., the decryption and signature operations) among several
parties. Sharing a private key operation in a threshold fashion requires first
choosing a suitable SSS to share the private key. Then the subject function
must be arranged according to this SSS such that combining the partial results
from any t parties will yield the operation’s result correctly. This is usually a
challenging task and requires some ingenious techniques.
In its simplest form, function sharing problem was investigated by several
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researchers such as Desmedt [20] and Goldreich et al. [37]. However the proposed
solutions in these works are impractical and interactive. After these works, the
function sharing problem was formally introduced by Desmedt and Frankel in
1989 [22]. They also proposed non-interactive and practical threshold function
sharing schemes for ElGamal encryption scheme. The solutions they proposed
were based on Shamir’s and Blakley’s SSSs.
After Desmedt and Frankel’s work, the function sharing problem for RSA
public-key cryptosystem was investigated by several researchers where Shamir’s
SSS was the main tool. The additive nature of the Lagrange interpolation used
in the combiner phase of Shamir’s scheme makes it a suitable choice for function
sharing, but it also provides several challenges, especially for RSA scheme. One
of the most significant challenges is the computation of inverses in Zφ(N) for
sharing the RSA function where φ(N) should not be known by the users. The
first solution to this problem was proposed by Desmedt and Frankel [21], which
solved the problem by making the dealer compute all potentially needed inverses
at the setup time and distribute them to users mixed with the shares. A more
elegant solution was found a few years later by De Santis et al. [66]. They carried
the arithmetic into a cyclotomic extension of Z, which enabled computing the
inverses without knowing φ(N). Finally, a very practical and ingenious solution
was given by Shoup [68] where he removed the need of taking inverses in Lagrange
interpolation altogether.
Shoup’s practical RSA scheme inspired similar works on different cryptosys-
tems. Fouque et al. [29] proposed a similar threshold solution for the Pail-
lier cryptosystem and used it in e-voting and lottery schemes. Later, Lysyan-
skaya et al. [50] improved this work and obtained a threshold Paillier encryption
scheme secure under the adaptive security model.
Although using Shamir’s SSS for sharing the ElGamal signature and decryp-
tion functions has its own unique problems, the computation of inverses in the
exponent is relatively easier than that in RSA since all of the operations are
done in mod p where p is a public prime hence φ(p) = p − 1 is also public. As
mentioned above, Desmedt and Frankel solved the function sharing problem in
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1989 for ElGamal decryption function. However, an ElGamal based threshold
signature was not proposed until 1996. In [34], Gennaro et al. proposed the first
efficient threshold scheme for the Digital Signature Standard.
As a summary, several solutions for sharing the RSA, ElGamal and Paillier
private key operations have been proposed in the literature [21, 22, 23, 24, 29, 34,
50, 66, 68]. The proposed solutions in these works are usually based on Shamir’s
SSS. To the best of our knowledge, before our work, no secure FSS has been
proposed for any of the cryptosystems mentioned above.
1.2.1 Extensions on Function Sharing Schemes
Since FSSs are based on SSSs, the extensions on secret sharing schemes can also
be described for function sharing schemes. For example, the robustness extension
is similar to the verifiability extension described in Section 1.1.1. We say that a
FSS is robust if it can withstand participation of corrupt users in the function
evaluation phase. The general approach to achieve robustness in function sharing
schemes is sending more information along with the partial result. In that ap-
proach, each user in the coalition sends a proof of correctness of his partial result.
In robust FSS schemes, a valid proof cannot be generated by a user unless he has
the correct share and the partial result is correct. In 1996, Gennaro et al. pro-
posed robust threshold RSA schemes [33] and a robust DSS signature scheme [34]
(improved and extended versions of these works by Gennaro et al. can be found
in [35, 36]).
Similar to verifiability, the proactivity extension described above also has a
counterpart in FSSs. A proactive approach can be used for FSSs by designing
protocols for periodic refreshment and integrity protection of local shares. With
this approach, the adversary will have only a short period of time to corrupt t
users and obtain their shares. In 1997, Herzberg et al. introduced the proactivity
problem and proposed proactive public key and signature schemes [38]. Their
approach can be used for several discrete log cryptosystems such as DSS and
Schnorr signatures, ElGamal-like signatures and encryption.
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1.3 Contributions and Outline
Nearly all existing solutions for function sharing are based on the Shamir SSS [67].
On the other hand, using CRT-based solutions for secret and function sharing
schemes has not been well-investigated. This thesis investigates how various
primitives and schemes in threshold cryptography can be securely realized by
using a CRT-based secret sharing scheme, i.e., Asmuth-Bloom SSS.
In Chapter 2, the original Asmuth-Bloom SSS is presented and its modified
versions which are more suitable for function sharing schemes are proposed. We
also propose a scheme for the non-threshold case that uses Asmuth-Bloom SSS
to share a secret among n people such that only predefined coalitions, which are
members of an access structure can reconstruct the secret.
Chapter 3 (based on [44], [49] and [43]) presents the threshold RSA scheme
based on the CRT. We also adapt our ideas used in the threshold RSA scheme
to propose threshold ElGamal and Paillier schemes. All of these schemes are
provably secure against an adversary with t−1 shares where t is the threshold. At
last we give a description of CRT-based threshold Naccache-Stern cryptosystem.
The Digital Signature Standard (DSS) is the current U.S. standard for dig-
ital signatures. In Chapter 4 (based on [48]) we investigate that how the DSS
signature function can be shared by using the Asmuth-Bloom SSS. We propose a
threshold DSS scheme and prove that the scheme is secure against an adversary
with t− 1 shares.
Secret and function sharing schemes can be enhanced by using various exten-
sions: As described in Section 1.1.1, we call a SSS verifiable if each user can verify
the correctness of his share in the dealing phase and no user can lie about his
share in the reconstruction phase. Another extension, proactivity, makes a SSS
capable of renewing the shares of the users without changing the long term secret
such that any shares obtained by a corrupted party before the renewal phase
become obsolete. For function sharing schemes, we say that a FSS is robust if it
can withstand participation of corrupt users in the function evaluation phase. In
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Chapter 5 (based on [45], [46], and [47]), we propose CRT-based verifiable and
proactive secret sharing schemes, and robust function sharing schemes.
We conclude the thesis with Chapter 6.
Chapter 2
Asmuth-Bloom Secret Sharing
Scheme
The Asmuth-Bloom secret sharing scheme is proposed by Asmuth and Bloom in
1983. Let n be the number of total users and t be the threshold, i.e., the size
of the smallest coalition that can reconstruct the secret. The original Asmuth-
Bloom SSS is close to perfect, i.e., for an adversary with t− 1 shares, the secret
can be any candidate from the secret domain. However, the probabilities of the
secret being equal to two different candidates are different where the difference
is non-negligible. To make the function sharing schemes in this thesis provably
secure, this difference must be negligible to make these two different candidates
indistinguishable from adversary’s point of view. Hence, the original scheme
needs to be modified to make it suitable for function sharing. In this chapter,
first the original scheme and then the required modifications are presented.
The CRT based schemes such as Asmuth-Bloom can also be used for generic
secret sharing. In such schemes, the valid coalitions which can reconstruct the
secret are defined by an access structure. Unlike the threshold case, any subset of
n users can be an element of the access structure and its cardinality need not to
be bigger than a threshold. We will conclude this chapter by describing a recent
scheme proposed by Bozkurt [13] which is based on the Asmuth-Bloom SSS and
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can be used for any access structure.
2.1 The Original Scheme
Dealing and reconstructing the secret in the Asmuth-Bloom SSS are described in
Fig. 2.1.
• Dealer Phase: To share a secret d among a group of n users, the dealer does
the following:
– A set of pairwise relatively prime integers m0 < m1 < m2 < . . . < mn,
where m0 > d is a prime, are chosen such that
t∏
i=1
mi > m0
t−1∏
i=1
mn−i+1. (2.1)
– Let M denote
∏t
i=1mi. The dealer computes
y = d+ Am0
where A is a positive integer generated randomly subject to the con-
dition that 0 ≤ y < M .
– The share of the ith user, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is
yi = y mod mi.
• Combiner Phase: Assume S is a coalition of t users gathered to construct
the secret. Let MS denote
∏
i∈Smi.
– Given the system
y ≡ yi (mod mi)
for i ∈ S, find y in ZMS using the Chinese Remainder Theorem.
– Compute the secret as
d = y mod m0.
Figure 2.1: The Asmuth-Bloom secret sharing scheme.
According to the Chinese Remainder Theorem, y can be determined uniquely
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in ZMS . Since y < M ≤MS, the solution is also unique in ZM .
The Asmuth-Bloom SSS is close to perfect in the sense that t−1 or fewer shares
do not narrow down the key space: Assume a coalition S ′ of size t−1 has gathered
and let y′ be the unique solution for y in ZMS′ . According to (2.1), M/MS′ > m0,
hence y′ + jMS′ is smaller than M for j < m0. Since gcd(m0,MS′) = 1, all
(y′ + jMS′) mod m0 are distinct for 0 ≤ j < m0, and there are m0 of them. That
is, d can be any integer from Zm0 . However, this scheme is not exactly perfect
since when t− 1 shares are known, the key candidates are not equally likely. We
refer the reader to a recent work by Quisquater et al. [63] for a detailed security
analysis of Asmuth-Bloom and some other Chinese Remainder Based SSSs.
2.2 The Modified Asmuth-Bloom Scheme
Several changes were needed on the basic Asmuth-Bloom scheme to make it more
suitable for function sharing. In this section we describe these modifications:
In the original Asmuth-Bloom SSS, the authors proposed an iterative process
to solve the system y ≡ yi (mod mi). Instead, we use a non-iterative and direct
solution as described in [25], which turns out to be more suitable for function
sharing in the sense that it does not require interaction between parties and has
an additive structure which is convenient for exponentiations. Suppose S is a
coalition of t users gathered to construct the secret d.
1. Let MS\{i} denote
∏
j∈S,j 6=imj and M
′
S,i be the multiplicative inverse of
MS\{i} in Zmi , i.e.,
MS\{i}M ′S,i ≡ 1 (mod mi).
First, the ith user computes
ui = yiM
′
S,iMS\{i} mod MS.
2. y is computed as
y =
∑
i∈S
ui mod MS.
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3. The secret d is computed as
d = y mod m0.
We note that, in the Asmuth-Bloom SSS, m0 need not be a prime, and the
scheme works correctly for a composite m0 as long as m0 is relatively prime
to mi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Also note that m0 need not be known during the secret
construction process until the 3rd step above.
We also modified (2.1) as
t∏
i=1
mi > m0
2
t−1∏
i=1
mn−i+1. (2.2)
in order to use it securely in the proposed FSSs. Note that equation (2.2) guar-
antees that d can be any integer from Zm0 when t−1 or fewer shares are revealed.
Theorem 2.2.1. For a passive adversary with t − 1 shares in the modified
Asmuth-Bloom scheme, every candidate for the secret is equally likely, i.e.,
the probabilities Pr(d = d′) and Pr(d = d′′) are approximately equal for all
d′, d′′ ∈ Zm0.
Proof. Suppose the adversary corrupts t − 1 users and just observes the inputs
and outputs of the corrupted users without controlling their actions, i.e., the
adversary is honest in user actions but curious about the secret. Let S ′ be the
adversarial coalition of size t− 1, and let y′ be the unique solution for y in ZMS′ .
According to (2.1), M/MS′ > m0, hence y
′+ jMS′ is smaller than M for j < m0.
Since gcd(m0,MS′) = 1, all (y
′ + jMS′) mod m0 are distinct for 0 ≤ j < m0, and
there are m0 of them. That is, d can be any integer from Zm0 . For each value
of d, there are either bM/(MS′m0)c or bM/(MS′m0)c + 1 possible values of y
consistent with d, depending on the value of d. Hence, for two different integers
in Zm0 , the probabilities of d equals these integers are almost equal. Note that
M/(MS′m0) > m0 and given that m0  1, all d values are approximately equally
likely.
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Note that the new equation (2.2) makes the scheme asymptotically perfect
but it also increases the share sizes. Hence the modified scheme is not ideal.
But the size of a share in the new scheme is two times larger than the one in
the original scheme hence the modified scheme is practical and it can be used in
various applications. For all of the schemes, mi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, are known by all
users, but m0 is kept secret by the dealer for some function sharing schemes such
as threshold RSA and Paillier schemes described in Chapter 3.
2.3 Asmuth-Bloom SSS for General Access
Structures
The secret sharing problem also arises for the general case: the secret is shared
among n participants such that only a specified set of authorized coalitions can
reconstruct the secret [8, 42]. Unlike the threshold case, the size of an authorized
coalition is not important and can be equal to any integer from 1 to n. Let
P = {1, . . . , n} be the set of participants. The set of authorized coalitions Γ ⊂ 2P
is called the access structure. Note that Γ is monotonically increasing, i.e.,
A ∈ Γ =⇒ B ∈ Γ, ∀B ⊃ A.
We denote the basis of Γ, i.e., the set of minimal elements in Γ, with Γ0. Hence
A ∈ Γ0 =⇒ @B ∈ Γ0, such that B ⊃ A.
The set of unauthorized coalitions ∆ ⊂ 2P is called the adversary structure. Note
that ∆ is monotonically decreasing, i.e.,
A ∈ ∆ =⇒ B ∈ ∆, ∀B ⊂ A.
We denote the set of maximal elements in ∆, with ∆1. Hence
A ∈ ∆1 =⇒ @B ∈ ∆1, such that B ⊂ A.
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It is obvious that ∆ ∩ Γ = ∅. Note that the threshold case with threshold t can
be represented as
Γ0 = {A ∈ 2P : |A| = t},
∆1 = {A ∈ 2P : |A| = t− 1}.
2.3.1 Multipartite Access Structures
Let P , the set of users, be partitioned into r disjoint sets X1,X2, . . . ,Xr. Each
set Xi has ni users and
∑r
i=1 ni = n. An access structure is multipartite when
all users in a given class play the same role. Let σ be a random permutation of
numbers 1 to n. Formally, we call an access structure Γ is r-partite if σ(Γ) = Γ
for any permutation σ such that σ(Xi) = Xi for i = {1, 2, . . . , r}.
Note that every access structure is multipartite since we can take r = n and
Xi = {i} for i = {1, 2, . . . , n}. But we are usually interested with the smallest
possible r value to characterize the access structure. A simple algorithm that
checks
Γ
?
= swap(Γ, i, j)
for each user pair i, j is sufficient to find the smallest r where swap(Γ, i, j) swaps
the user i and j in Γ and returns the resulting access structure. If the equality
holds, it is obvious that users i and j should be in the same partition.
Let ω : 2P → (Zn1+1 × Zn2+1 × . . .× Znr+1) be a function such that
ω(A) = (|A ∩ X1|, |A ∩ X2|, . . . , |A ∩ Xr|).
Since the users in the same class play the same role, an access structure Γ can be
uniquely represented as a set of r-ary vectors
Ω(Γ) = {ω(A) : A ∈ Γ}.
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2.3.2 Asmuth-Bloom SSS for Multipartite Access Struc-
tures
The Asmuth-Bloom secret sharing scheme can be also used for general access
structures. Here we will describe a scheme by [13] which uses Asmuth-Bloom
SSS for secret sharing in multipartite access structures. Let us first recall that
the modified Asmuth-Bloom SSS is perfect. For every part Xi, we choose the
moduli m0 < m1,i < m2,i < . . . , < mni,i as consecutive primes such that they
satisfy
bni/2c∏
j=1
mj,i > m0
bni/2c−1∏
j=1
mni−j+1,i. (2.3)
Note that (2.3) is the inequality used for a (bni/2c, ni) threshold secret sharing.
Also 2.3 implies
t∏
j=1
mj,i > m0
t∏
j=1
mni−j+1,i
for every value of t. Hence, the moduli can be used for a (t, ni)-secret sharing
scheme for 1 ≤ t ≤ ni.
In the SSS described below, we will use Ω(Γ0) instead of Ω(Γ) and show
that any coalition in Γ can reconstruct the secret. We say that a r-ary vector
(K1, K2, . . . , Kr) dominates the vector (k1, k2, . . . , kr) if Ki ≥ ki for 1 ≤ i ≤ r.
The SSS is given in Fig. 2.2.
In Fig. 2.2, each user in Xi has a share for each vector in Ω(Γ0) if the ith
element of the vector is nonzero. S ∈ Γ if and only if there exists a vector in
Ω(Γ0) dominated by (K1, K2, . . . , Kr) where Ki = |S∩Xi|. The users in S∩Xi can
construct di since di is shared with a (ki, ni)-secret sharing scheme and Ki ≥ ki.
Let S ′ be an adversarial coalition. Let K ′i = |S ′ ∩ Xi|. Since S ′ /∈ Γ,
(K ′1, K
′
2, . . . , K
′
r) cannot dominate a vector in Ω(Γ0). Hence for each vector in
Ω(Γ0), there exists at least one i such that ki > K
′
i. Since Asmuth-Bloom SSS
is perfect, S ′ cannot obtain any information on at least one di, for each vector.
Hence the scheme given in Fig. 2.2 is also perfect.
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Dealer Phase: Let Γ be an r-partite access structure. To share a secret d according to
Γ, the dealer does the following:
• For each r-ary vector (k1, k2, . . . , kr) ∈ Ω(Γ0) the dealer
– chooses random di ∈ Zm0s for 1 ≤ i ≤ r where
∑r
i=1 di ≡ d mod m0.
– shares di among the users in Xi by using a (ki, ni) Asmuth-Bloom secret
sharing scheme.
Combiner Phase: Assume S is the coalition gathered to construct the secret. Let
Ki = |S ∩ Xi| and (k1, k2, . . . , kr) ∈ Ω(Γ0) be a vector dominated by (K1,K2, . . . ,Kr).
• For each 1 ≤ i ≤ r, the users from Xi in S can construct the corresponding di
for the vector (k1, k2, . . . , kr) since Ki ≥ ki.
• The secret d is the constructed by
d =
r∑
i=1
di mod m0.
Figure 2.2: Using Asmuth-Bloom SSS for general access structures.
Chapter 3
Sharing RSA and Similar
Functions with CRT
In this chapter, we show how sharing of cryptographic functions can be securely
achieved using the Asmuth-Bloom secret sharing scheme. We give four novel
FSSs, one for the RSA [65], one for the ElGamal decryption [26], one for the
Paillier decryption [57], and the other for the Nacceche-Stern decryption [54]
functions. These public key cryptosystems have several interesting properties
useful in various applications [1, 4, 29, 51, 56]. The proposed schemes are provably
secure and to the best of our knowledge they are the first realizations of secure
function sharing based on the Asmuth-Bloom SSS.
3.1 CRT-based Threshold RSA Scheme
RSA [65] is the first and the most commonly used public key cryptosystem today.
Here we show how the RSA signature and decryption functions can be shared
by using the Asmuth-Bloom SSS. Below, we limit our discussion to the RSA
signature function since these two functions are identical and the same technique
can be applied for sharing the decryption function as well. The description of the
RSA signature scheme is given in Fig. 3.1.
18
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• Setup: Let N = pq be the product of two large prime numbers. Choose
a random e ∈ Z∗φ(N) and find its inverse d, i.e., ed ≡ 1 (mod φ(N)). The
public and private keys are (N, e) and d, respectively.
• Signing : Given a hashed message w ∈ ZN , the signature s is computed as
s = wd mod N.
• Verification: Given a signature s ∈ ZN , the verification is done by checking
w
?
= se mod N.
Figure 3.1: The RSA signature scheme.
Threshold RSA Signature Scheme: The following is a procedure that
shares the RSA signature function among n users with the Asmuth-Bloom SSS
such that when t users come together they can compute the signature:
• Setup: In the RSA setup phase, choose the RSA primes p = 2p′ + 1 and
q = 2q′ + 1 where p′ and q′ are also large random primes. N = pq is
computed and the public key e and private key d are chosen from Z∗φ(N)
where ed ≡ 1 (mod φ(N)). Use Asmuth-Bloom SSS for sharing d with
m0 = φ(N) = 4p
′q′.
• Signing : Let w be the hashed message to be signed and suppose the range
of the hash function is Z∗N . Assume a coalition S of size t wants to obtain
the signature s = wd mod N .
– Generating partial results : Each user i ∈ S computes
ui = yiM
′
S,iMS\{i} mod MS,
si = w
ui mod N.
– Combining partial results : The incomplete signature s is obtained by
combining the si values
s =
∏
i∈S
si mod N. (3.1)
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– Correction: Let κ = w−MS mod N be the corrector. The incomplete
signature can be corrected by trying
(sκj)e = se(κe)j
?≡ w (mod N) (3.2)
for 0 ≤ j < t. Then the signature s is computed by
s = sκδ mod N
where δ denotes the value of j that satisfies (3.2).
• Verification is the same as the standard RSA verification.
We call the signature s generated in (3.1) incomplete since we need to obtain
y =
∑
i∈S ui mod MS as the exponent of w. Once this is achieved, we have
wy ≡ wd (mod N) as y = d+ Am0 for some A where m0 = φ(N).
Note that the equality in (3.2) must hold for some j ≤ t − 1 since the ui
values were already reduced modulo MS. So, combining t of them in (3.1) will
give d+am0 +δMS in the exponent for some δ ≤ t−1. Thus in (3.1), we obtained
s = wd+δMS mod N = swδMS mod N = sκ−δ mod N
and for j = δ, equation (3.2) will hold. Also since φ(N) t, with overwhelming
probability, there will be a unique value of s = sκj which satisfies (3.2).
3.1.1 Security Analysis
Here we will prove that the proposed threshold RSA signature scheme is se-
cure (i.e. existentially non-forgeable against an adaptive chosen message attack),
provided that the RSA problem is intractable (i.e. RSA function is a one-way
trapdoor function [18]). Throughout the thesis, we assume a static adversary
model where the adversary controls exactly t− 1 users and chooses them at the
beginning of the attack. In this model, the adversary obtains all secret informa-
tion of the corrupted users and the public parameters of the cryptosystem. She
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can control the actions of the corrupted users, ask for partial signatures of the
messages of her choice, but she cannot corrupt another user in the course of an
attack, i.e., the adversary is static in that sense.
Theorem 3.1.1. Given that the standard RSA signature scheme is secure, the
threshold RSA signature scheme is secure under the static adversary model.
Proof. To reduce the problem of breaking the standard RSA signature scheme to
breaking the proposed threshold scheme, we will simulate the threshold protocol
with no information on the secret where the output of the simulator is indis-
tinguishable from the adversary’s point of view. Afterwards, we will show that
the secrecy of the private key d is not disrupted by the values obtained by the
adversary. Thus, if the threshold RSA scheme is not secure, i.e., an adversary
who controls t−1 users can forge signatures in the threshold scheme, one can use
this simulator to forge a signature in the standard RSA scheme.
Let S ′ denote the set of users controlled by the adversary. To simulate the
adversary’s view, the simulator first selects a random interval I = [a, b) from ZM ,
M =
∏t
i=1 mi. The start point a is randomly chosen from ZM and the end point is
computed as b = a+m0MS′ . Then, the shares of the corrupted users are computed
as yj = a mod mj for j ∈ S ′. Note that, these t− 1 shares are indistinguishable
from random ones due to (2.2) and the improved perfectness condition. Although
the simulator does not know the real value of d, it is guaranteed that there exists
a y ∈ I which is congruent to yj (mod mj) and d (mod m0) for all possible d
values.
Since we have a (t, n)-threshold scheme, given a valid RSA signature (s, w),
the partial signature si for a user i /∈ S ′ can be obtained by
si = sκ
−δS
∏
j∈S′
(wuj)−1 mod N
where S = S ′ ∪ {i}, κ = w−MS mod N and δS is equal to either⌊∑
j∈S′ uj
MS
⌋
+ 1 or
⌊∑
j∈S′ uj
MS
⌋
.
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The value of δS is important because it carries information on y. Let U =
∑
j∈S′ uj
and US = U mod MS. One can find whether y is greater than US or not by
looking at δS:
y < US if δS = bU/MSc+ 1,
y ≥ US if δS = bU/MSc,
Since the simulator does not know the real value of y, to determine the value of
δS, the simulator acts according to the interval randomly chosen at the beginning
of the simulation.
δS =
{
bU/MSc+ 1, if a < US
bU/MSc, if a ≥ US
(3.3)
It is obvious that, the value of δS is indistinguishable from the real case if
US /∈ I. Now, we will prove that the δS values computed by the simulator does
not disrupt the indistinguishability from the adversary’s point of view. First of
all, there are (n− t+ 1) possible δS computed by using US since all the operations
in the exponent depend on the coalition S alone. If none of the US values lies
in I, the δS values observed by the adversary will be indistinguishable from a
real execution of the protocol. Using this observation, we can prove that no
information about the private key is obtained by the adversary.
Observing the t − 1 randomly generated shares, there are m0 = φ(N) candi-
dates in I for y which satisfy yj = y mod mj for all j ∈ S ′. These m0 candidates
have all different remainders modulo m0 since gcd(MS′ ,m0) = 1. So, exactly
one of the remainders is equal to the private key d. If US /∈ I for all S, given
an si, the shared value y can be equal to any of these m0 candidates hence any
two different values of the secret key d will be indistinguishable from adversary’s
point of view. In our case, this happens with all but negligible probability. First,
observe that US ≡ 0 mod mi and there are m0MS′/mi multiples of mi in I. Thus,
the probability of US /∈ I for a coalition S is equal to(
1− m0MS′/mi
MS′
)
=
(
1− m0MS′
MS
)
.
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According to (2.2), mi > m0
2 for all i hence the probability of US /∈ I for all
possible S is less than
(
1− 1
m0
)n−t+1
, which is almost surely 1 for m0  n.
Consequently, the output of the simulator is indistinguishable from a real
instance from the adversary’s point of view, and hence the simulator can be used
to forge a signature in the standard RSA scheme if the threshold RSA scheme
can be broken.
3.2 Using Chinese Remainder Theorem for
Sharing Other Functions
3.2.1 Sharing of the ElGamal Decryption Function
The ElGamal cryptosystem [26] is another popular public key scheme proposed
by T. ElGamal in 1989. It is an inherently probabilistic and semantically secure
encryption scheme. For a cryptosystem to be semantically secure, it must be in-
feasible for a computationally-bounded adversary to derive significant information
about a message (plaintext) when given only its ciphertext and the corresponding
public encryption key. The description of the cryptosystem is given in Fig. 3.2.
ElGamal encryption scheme, like RSA, has the following multiplicative homo-
morphic property:
E(w)× E(w′) = E(ww′)
for messages w and w′ where E stands for the encryption function and × is the
component-wise multiplication. Since the standard RSA encryption is determin-
istic, it is not semantically secure. One can use random padding to add semantic
security as in [6]. However, this removes the homomorphic property. ElGamal
does not suffer from such a problem since it is inherently semantically secure.
This property makes ElGamal encryption suitable for use in threshold password
authenticated key exchange protocols [1].
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• Setup: Let p be a large prime and g be a generator of Zp. Choose a random
α ∈ {1, . . . , p−1} and compute β = gα mod p. (β, g, p) and α are the public
and private keys, respectively.
• Encryption: Given a message w ∈ Zp, the ciphertext c = (c1, c2) is com-
puted as
c1 = g
r mod p
c2 = β
rw mod p
where r is a random integer from Zp.
• Decryption: Given a ciphertext c, the message w is computed as
w = (c1
α)−1c2 mod p.
Figure 3.2: ElGamal’s encryption scheme.
Threshold ElGamal Encryption Scheme: The following is a procedure
that shares the ElGamal decryption function among n users with the Asmuth-
Bloom SSS such that when t users come together they can decrypt the ciphertext:
• Setup: In the ElGamal setup phase, choose p = 2q + 1 where q is a large
random prime and let g ∈ Z∗p with order q. Choose a random α ∈ {1, . . . , p−
1} and compute β = gα mod p. Let α and (β, g, p) be the private and the
public keys, respectively. Use Asmuth-Bloom SSS for sharing the private
key α with m0 = 2q.
• Encryption is the same as the standard ElGamal encryption.
• Decryption: Let (c1, c2) be the ciphertext to be decrypted where c1 =
gk mod p for some k ∈ {1, . . . , p−1} and c2 = βkw where w is the message.
The coalition S of t users wants to obtain the message w = sc2 mod p for
the decryptor s = (cα1 )
−1 mod p.
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– Generating partial results : Each user i ∈ S computes
ui = yiM
′
S,iMS\{i} mod MS, (3.4)
si = c1
−ui mod p,
βi = g
ui mod p. (3.5)
– Combining partial results : The incomplete decryptor s is obtained by
combining the si values
s =
∏
i∈S
si mod p.
– Correction: The βi values will be used to find the exponent which will
be used to correct the incomplete decryptor. Compute the incomplete
public key β as
β =
∏
i∈S
βi mod p. (3.6)
Let κs = c1
MS mod p and κβ = g
−MS mod p be the correctors for s and
β, respectively. The corrector exponent δ can be obtained by trying
βκjβ
?≡ β (mod p) (3.7)
for 0 ≤ j < t.
– Extracting the message: Compute the message w as
s = sκs
δ mod p,
w = sc2 mod p.
where δ denotes the value of j that satisfies (3.7).
As in the case of RSA, the decryptor s is incomplete since we need to obtain
y =
∑
i∈S ui mod MS as the exponent of c
−1
1 . Once this is achieved, (c
−1
1 )
y ≡
(c−11 )
α (mod p) since y = α + Aφ(p) for some A.
When the equality in (3.7) holds we know that β = gα mod p is the correct
public key. This equality must hold for one j value, denoted by δ, in the given
interval because since the ui values in (3.4) and (3.5) are first reduced modulo
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MS. So, combining t of them will give α + am0 + δMS in the exponent in (3.6)
for some δ ≤ t− 1. Thus in (3.6), we obtained
β = gα+am0+δMS mod p ≡ gα+δMS = βgδMS = βκ−δβ (mod p)
and for j = δ equality must hold. Actually, in (3.6) and (3.7), our purpose is not
computing the public key since it is already known. We want to find the corrector
exponent δ to obtain s, which is also equal to the one we use to obtain β. The
equality can be verified as seen below:
s ≡ c1−α = β−r
=
(
g−(α+(δ−δ)MS)
)r
= c1
−(α+am0+δMS) (c1MS)δ = sκsδ (mod p)
3.2.1.1 Security Analysis
Here, we will prove that the threshold ElGamal encryption scheme is semantically
secure provided that the standard ElGamal encryption scheme is semantically
secure. We refer the reader to [29] for a formal definition of the threshold semantic
security.
Theorem 3.2.1. Given that the standard ElGamal encryption scheme is seman-
tically secure, the threshold ElGamal encryption scheme is semantically secure
under the static adversary model.
Proof. The structure of the proof is similar to that we did for the threshold RSA
signature scheme. Let S ′ denote the set of users controlled by the adversary.
To simulate the adversary’s view, the simulator first selects a random interval
I = [a, b) from ZM , M =
∏t
i=1 mi. The start point a is randomly chosen from
ZM and the end point is computed as b = a + m0MS′ . Then, the shares of the
corrupted users are computed as yj = a mod mj for j ∈ S ′.
Since we have a (t, n)-threshold scheme, when we determine the yj values for
j ∈ S ′, the shares of other users are also determined. Although they cannot
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be computed easily, given a valid message-ciphertext pair (w, (c1, c2)) the partial
decryptor si and βi for a user i /∈ S ′ can be obtained by
si =
(
wc2
−1)κs−δS ∏
j∈S′
c1
uj mod p,
βi = βκβ
−δS
∏
j∈S′
(βuj)−1 mod p.
where S = S ′ ∪{i}, κs = c1MS mod p, κβ = g−MS mod p and δS is equal to either⌊∑
j∈S′ uj
MS
⌋
+ 1 or
⌊∑
j∈S′ uj
MS
⌋
.
We use the same ideas to choose the value of δS as in the previous simulator so
we skip the details and the analysis for the secrecy of the private key in the proof.
Consequently, the output of the simulator is indistinguishable from the ad-
versary’s point of view, and hence we proved that the threshold ElGamal scheme
must be semantically secure if the standard one is.
3.2.2 Sharing of the Paillier Decryption Function
Paillier’s probabilistic cryptosystem [57] is a member of a different class of cryp-
tosystems where the message is used in the exponent of the encryption operation.
The description of the cryptosystem is given in Fig. 3.3.
Paillier’s encryption scheme is probabilistic and has interesting homomorphic
properties:
E(w1)E(w2) = E(w1 + w2)
E(w)a = E(aw)
for messages, w,w1, w2 and a random integer a where E stands for the encryption
function. These homomorphic properties make this encryption scheme suitable
for different applications such as secure voting and lottery protocols [4, 29], DSA
sharing protocols [51], and private information retrieval [56].
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• Setup: Let N = pq be the product of two large primes and λ = lcm(p −
1, q − 1). Choose a random g ∈ ZN2 such that the order of g is a multiple
of N . The public and private keys are (N, g) and λ, respectively.
• Encryption: Given a message w ∈ ZN , the ciphertext c is computed as
c = gwrN mod N2
where r is a random number from ZN .
• Decryption: Given a ciphertext c ∈ ZN2 , the message w is computed as
w =
L
(
cλ mod N2
)
L (gλ mod N2)
mod N
where L(x) = x−1
N
, for x ≡ 1 (mod N).
Figure 3.3: Paillier’s encryption scheme.
Threshold Paillier Encryption Scheme: The following is a procedure that
shares the Paillier decryption function among n users with the Asmuth-Bloom
SSS such that when t users come together they can decrypt the ciphertext. The
setup part below is inspired by [29]:
• Setup: In the Paillier setup phase, choose large primes p = 2p′ + 1 and q =
2q′+ 1 where p′ and q′ are also large random primes and gcd(N, φ(N)) = 1
for N = pq. Let g = (1 + N)abN mod N2 for random a and b from Z∗N .
Compute θ = aβλ mod N for a random β ∈ Z∗N where λ = lcm(p−1, q−1)
is the Carmichael number for N . Let (N, g, θ) and λ be the public and
private keys, respectively . Use the Asmuth-Bloom SSS to share βλ with
m0 = Nλ.
• Encryption is the same as the standard Paillier encryption.
• Decryption: Let c = gwrN mod N2 be the ciphertext to be decrypted for
some random r ∈ Z∗N where w is the message from ZN . Assume a coalition
S of size t wants to obtain the message w = L(c
βλ mod N2)
θ
mod N . We call
s = cβλ mod N2 as the decryptor.
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– Generating partial results : Each user i ∈ S computes
ui = yiM
′
S,iMS\{i} mod MS,
si = c
ui mod N2,
θi = g
ui mod N2.
– Combining partial results : The incomplete decryptor s is obtained by
combining the si values
s =
∏
i∈S
si mod N
2.
– Correction: The θi values will be used to find the exponent which
corrects the incomplete decryptor. Compute the incomplete θ as
θ =
∏
i∈S
θi mod N
2. (3.8)
Let κs = c
−MS mod N2 and κθ = g−MS mod N2 be the correctors for
s and θ, respectively. The corrector exponent δ can be obtained by
trying
θ
?
= L(θκjθ mod N
2) (3.9)
for 0 ≤ j < t. Note that, for wrong corrector exponents L is undefined.
– Extracting the message: Compute the message w as
s = sκs
δ mod N2,
w =
L(s)
θ
mod N.
where δ denotes the value for j that satisfies (3.9).
The decryptor s is incomplete and to find the corrector exponent we used a
similar approach. When the equality in (3.9) holds we know that θ = aβλ mod N2
is the correct value. Also, this equality must hold for one j value, denoted by δ,
in the given interval. Actually, in (3.8) and (3.9), our purpose is not computing
θ since it is already known. We want to find the corrector exponent δ to obtain
s, which is also equal to the one we used to obtain θ.
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3.2.2.1 Security Analysis
Here, we will prove that the threshold Paillier encryption scheme is semantically
secure provided that the standard Paillier encryption scheme is semantically se-
cure.
Theorem 3.2.2. Given that the standard Paillier encryption scheme is semanti-
cally secure, the threshold Paillier encryption scheme is semantically secure under
the static adversary model.
Proof. The structure of the proof is similar to those we did for the previous
threshold schemes. Let S ′ denote the set of users controlled by the adversary.
To simulate the adversary’s view, the simulator first selects a random interval
I = [a, b) from ZM , M =
∏t
i=1 mi. The start point a is randomly chosen from
ZM and the end point is computed as b = a + m0MS′ . Then, the shares of the
corrupted users are computed as yj = a mod mj for j ∈ S ′.
Since we have a (t, n)-threshold scheme, when we determine the yj values for
j ∈ S ′, the shares of other users are also determined. Although they cannot be
computed easily, given a valid message-ciphertext pair (w, c) the decryptor share
si and θi for a user i /∈ S ′ can be obtained by
si = (1 + wθN)κs
−δS
∏
j∈S′
(c1
uj)−1 mod N2,
θi = (1 + θN)κθ
−δS
∏
j∈S′
(θuj)−1 mod N2.
where S = S ′ ∪ {i}, κs = c−MS mod N2, κθ = g−MS mod N2 and δS is equal to
either ⌊∑
j∈S′ uj
MS
⌋
+ 1 or
⌊∑
j∈S′ uj
MS
⌋
.
We use the same ideas to choose the value of δS as in the previous simulator so
we skip the details and the analysis for the secrecy of the private key in the proof.
Consequently, the output of the simulator is indistinguishable from the ad-
versary’s point of view, and hence we proved that the threshold Paillier scheme
must be semantically secure if the standard one is.
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3.2.3 Sharing of the Naccache-Stern Decryption Function
A different cryptosystem which uses bitwise encryption was proposed by Naccache
and Stern [54]. This cryptosystem is based on a type of knapsack problem: Given
arbitrary integers c, l, p, and a vector of integers x = (x1, ..., xn), find a vector
w ∈ {0, 1}l such that
c ≡
l∏
i=1
xi
wi mod p (3.10)
When the xi are relatively prime and much smaller than the modulus p, this
knapsack problem can be solved easily. When xi are arbitrary numbers in Zp,
the problem is hard. The cryptosystem is given in Figure 3.4.
• Setup: Let p be a large prime, l be a positive integer and for i from 1 to
l, set pi to be the ith prime, starting with p1 = 2. Choose a secret integer
d < p− 1, such that gcd(p− 1, d) = 1. Set vi = d√pi mod p. The public key
is then p, l, v = (v1, . . . , vl). The private key is d.
• Encryption: To encrypt an l-bit long message w, calculate
c =
l∏
i=1
vi
wi mod p. (3.11)
where wi is the ith bit of message w.
• Decryption: One can obtain the plaintext by computing
w =
l∑
i=1
gcd(pi, c
d mod p)− 1
pi − 1 × 2
i. (3.12)
Figure 3.4: Naccache-Stern’s encryption scheme.
Threshold Naccache-Stern Encryption Scheme: To the best of our
knowledge, no FSSs have been proposed for the Naccache-Stern knapsack cryp-
tosystem. Here we give the first realization of an FSS for this cryptosystem with
Asmuth-Bloom SSS:
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1. In the Naccache-Stern Knapsack setup, choose p be a safe prime, l be a
positive integer and for i from 1 to l, set pi to be the ith prime, starting
with p1 = 2. Choose a secret integer d < p− 1, such that gcd(p− 1, d) = 1.
Set xi = d
√
pi mod p. Set the public key be p, l, x. The private key d is
shared with m0 = p− 1.
2. Let c be the ciphertext to be decrypted where c =
∏l
i=1 xi
wi mod p and
assume a coalition S of size t wants to obtain the plaintext w. The ith
person in the coalition knows mj for all j ∈ S and yi = y mod mi as its
secret share.
3. Each user i ∈ S computes
ui = yiM
′
S,iMS\{i} mod MS ,
si = c
ui mod p.
4. The incomplete decryptor s is obtained by combining the si values
s =
∏
i∈S
si mod p. (3.13)
5. Let κ = c−MS mod p be the corrector. The corrector exponent δ can be
obtained by trying
x1
sκj ?≡ 2 mod p (3.14)
for 0 ≤ j < t.
6. Compute the plaintext message w as
s = sκδ mod p,
w =
l∑
i=1
(gcd(pi, s mod p)− 1)
pi − 1 × 2
i.
Where δ denotes the j value that satisfies (3.14).
CHAPTER 3. SHARING RSA AND SIMILAR FUNCTIONS WITH CRT 33
The decryptor s is incomplete since we need to obtain y =
∑
i∈S ui mod MS as
the exponent of c. Once this is achieved, cy ≡ cd mod p, since y = d + a(p− 1)
for some a.
Note that the equality in (3.14) must hold for one j ≤ t−1 since the ui values
were already reduced modulo MS. So, combining t of them in (3.13) will give
d+ am0 + δMS in the exponent for some δ ≤ t− 1. Thus we obtained
s = cd+am0+δMS ≡ cd+δMS ≡ scδMS ≡ sκ−δ mod p (3.15)
and for j = δ, equation (3.14) will hold.
3.3 Efficiency Analysis of the Proposed Schemes
Although the proposed schemes are not more efficient than Shoup’s work [68],
which is the fastest threshold RSA signature scheme, they are comparable in per-
formance. In this section, we give an efficiency analysis of the proposed schemes.
First, we compare the proposed threshold RSA scheme with the basic RSA scheme
in [68] in terms of share size and computation cost. For the computation cost,
the dominating factor is the exponentiation operations hence we are mainly inter-
ested in the number of exponentiations. Note that, the cost of an exponentiation
is proportional to the size of the exponent.
• Share size: In [68], the size of a share is approximately k bits for a k-bit
modulus N . In our case, because of (2.2) the size of a share is about 2k
bits for the same N .
• Computing partial signatures: In [68], it takes an exponentiation with a
(k + log(n!))-bit exponent to compute a partial signature. In the proposed
scheme,
ui = yiM
′
S,iMS\{i} mod MS
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is a 2kt-bit integer. To compute it efficiently we first compute M ′S,i and
r = byiM ′S,i/mic which are 2k-bit integers. Now ui is equal to
ui = MS\{i}(yiM ′S,i − rmi)
and computing the partial signature si = w
ui mod N needs a modular ex-
ponentiation with 2kt-bit exponent. Note that no extra storage is needed
to store ui.
• Combining partial signatures: In [68], combining the partial results requires
t exponentiations with approximately log(n!)-bit exponents, hence the cost
is t log(n!). After that, these t results are multiplied to obtain the signa-
ture. In the proposed scheme, after obtaining the incomplete signature, an
exponentiation with a 2kt-bit exponent is needed to compute the corrector.
Note that while computing the partial signature the ith player computes
wMS\{i} mod N as an intermediate value. The combiner can compute its
inverse and raise it to the mith power to compute the corrector which re-
quires an exponentiation with 2k-bit exponent rather than 2kt. After that,
at most 2t more multiplications are required for computing the incomplete
signature and checking equation (3.2).
Criteria Shoup’s scheme Proposed scheme
Share sizes k 2k
Cost of computing partial signatures k + log(n!) 2kt
Cost of combining partial signatures t log(n!) 2k
Table 3.1: Comparison of the proposed threshold RSA signature scheme with
Shoup’s scheme [68] in terms of the share sizes, and the cost of computing and
combining the partial signatures measured in terms of the total size of exponents.
Table 3.1 compares the performance of the proposed scheme with that of [68].
Although not more efficient, the proposed RSA signature scheme is comparable
in performance to Shoup’s scheme given that t is a small integer, which is the case
in a typical application. Regarding the proposed threshold ElGamal and Pallier
schemes, their complexities are similar to that of the threshold RSA scheme and
hence the comparisons are similar to that in Table 3.1.
Chapter 4
Sharing DSS with CRT
The Digital Signature Standard (DSS) is the current U.S. standard for digital
signatures. Sharing DSS is an interesting problem and a neat solution was given
by Gennaro et al. [34] based on Shamir’s SSS. In this chapter, we propose a new
threshold scheme for the Digital Signature Standard by using the Asmuth-Bloom
SSS. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first provably secure threshold DSS
scheme based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem. The DSS scheme is given in
Fig. 4.1.
4.1 Modifications on Asmuth-Bloom SSS for
DSS
To adapt the original scheme for threshold DSS, if n > 3t−1, we first modify the
equation (2.1) used in the Asmuth-Bloom secret sharing scheme in Chapter 2 as
2t∏
i=1
mi > nm0
2
2t−1∏
i=1
mn−i+1. (4.1)
Note that if n > 3t− 1, (4.1) also implies that
t∏
i=1
mi > nm0
2
t−1∏
i=1
mn−i+1. (4.2)
35
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• Key Generation Phase: Let p and q be large prime numbers where q|p− 1
and g ∈ Z∗p be an element of order q. The private key α ∈R Z∗q is chosen
randomly and the public key β = gα mod p is computed.
• Signing Phase: The signer first chooses a random ephemeral key k ∈R Z∗q
and then computes the signature (r, s) where
r = (gk
−1
mod p) mod q
s = k(w + αr) mod q
for a hashed message w ∈ Zq.
• Verification Phase: The signature (r, s) is verified by checking
r
?
= (gws
−1
βrs
−1
mod p) mod q
where s−1 is computed in Z∗q.
Figure 4.1: The DSS scheme.
If n ≤ 3t − 1, (4.2) implies (4.1) and we generate the mis with respect to (4.2).
In general, we will use (4.2) for t-out-of-n secret sharing schemes in the primi-
tives which will be described later. For one primitive, Joint-ZS, which will be
described in next section, we will use a 2t-out-of-n sharing by using (4.1). We
also change the definition of M as
M =
⌊∏t
i=1 mi
n
⌋
.
4.1.1 Arithmetic Properties of the Modified Asmuth-
Bloom SSS
Suppose multiple secrets are shared with common parameters t, n, and moduli
mis. The shareholders can use the following properties to obtain new shares for
the sum and product of the shared secrets.
Proposition 4.1.1. Let d1, d2, · · · , dn be secrets shared by Asmuth-Bloom SSS
with common parameters t, n, and moduli mis. Let yij be the share of the ith
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user for secret dj. Then, for
D = (
n∑
i=1
di) mod m0
Yi = (
n∑
j=1
yij) mod mi,
we have
D
t↔ (Y1, Y2, · · · , Yn),
i.e., the secret D is t-out-of-n shared with shares Y1, Y2, · · · , Yn.
Proof. For
Y =
n∑
i=1
(di + Aim0),
we have Yi ≡ Y mod mi. Note that due to (4.2), Y < nM < MS for any coalition
S where |S| ≥ t. Hence, a coalition S of t users can construct Y ∈MS and obtain
D = Y mod m0.
Proposition 4.1.2. Let d1, d2 be secrets shared by Asmuth-Bloom SSS with com-
mon parameters t, n and moduli mis. Let yij be the share of the ith user for secret
dj. Then, for
D = d1d2 mod m0,
Yi = y1y2 mod mi,
we have
D
2t↔ (Y1, Y2, · · · , Yn).
Proof. For
Y =
2∏
i=1
(di + Aim0),
we have Yi ≡ Y mod mi. Note that Y < M2 < MS for any coalition S where
|S| ≥ 2t. Hence, a coalition S of 2t users can construct Y ∈ MS and obtain
D = Y mod m0.
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4.2 The Threshold DSS Scheme
To obtain a threshold DSS scheme, first the dealer generates the private key α
and shares it among the users by a (t, n) Asmuth-Bloom secret sharing scheme
with m0 = q. Then a signing coalition S can sign a message in a threshold
fashion without requiring a trusted party. Note that anyone can obtain the secret
key α and forge signatures if he knows k for a valid signature (r, s). Hence,
r = (gk
−1
mod p) mod q must be computed in a way that no one obtains k. Here,
we first explain the necessary primitives that will be used to solve this problem
and then describe the overall threshold signature scheme together. Below, S
denotes the signing coalition of size 2t+ 1. Without loss of generality, we assume
S = {1, 2, . . . , 2t + 1}. We will first describe the primitive tools we used in the
proposed CRT-based threshold DSS scheme. In these primitives, we set m0 = q.
4.2.1 Joint Random Secret Sharing
In a joint random secret sharing scheme (Joint-RSS), each user in the signing
coalition S contributes something to the secret generation process and obtains a
share for the resulting random secret as described in Fig. 4.2. A verifiable version
of this scheme can be found in Chapter 5.
• Each user j ∈ S chooses a random secret dj ∈ Zm0 and shares it as dj t↔
(y1j , y2j , · · · , y(2t+1)j) where yij is the share of the ith user.
• The ith user computes
Yi =
2t+1∑
j=1
yij
 mod mi.
By Proposition 4.1.1, D t↔ (Y1, Y2, . . . , Y2t+1) is a valid and secure t-out-of-(2t+1)
SSS for
D =
(
2t+1∑
i=1
di
)
mod m0.
Figure 4.2: CRT-based Joint-RSS procedure.
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4.2.2 Joint Zero Sharing
In a joint zero sharing scheme (Joint-ZS), each user in the signing coalition S
contributes something to the random zero generation process and obtains a share
for the resulting zero, as described in Fig. 4.3.
• Each user j ∈ S shares 0 2t↔ (y1j , y2j , · · · , y(2t+1)j) where yij = Ajm0 mod mi is
the share of the ith user for some Ajm0 < M . Here the value M is modified as
follows:
M =
⌊∏2t
i=1mi
n
⌋
.
Note that the moduli mis satisfy the equation (4.1).
• The ith user computes
Yi =
2t+1∑
j=1
yij
 mod mi.
By Proposition 4.1.1, D 2t↔ (Y1, Y2, . . . , Y2t+1) is a valid 2t-out-of-(2t+1) scheme.
Figure 4.3: CRT-based Joint-ZS procedure.
4.2.3 Computing gd mod p
For threshold DSS, we will need to share and compute gd mod p for a joint random
secret d ∈ Zq. Fig. 4.4 describes a scheme, Joint-Exp-RSS, to construct an
approximate value for Fd = g
d mod p. This approximate value will later be
corrected through a separate correction process.
Observe that d = ((
∑
i∈S ui) mod MS) mod q whereas this construction pro-
cess computes Fd′ = g
d′ mod p for d′ =
∑
i∈S ui mod q. Since there are 2t+1 users
in S and ui < MS for all i, d = d
′ − δdMS mod q for some integer 0 ≤ δd ≤ 2t.
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• To compute Fd = gd mod p for a random secret value d, S uses Joint-RSS to
generate and share d as d t↔ (y1, y2, . . . , y2t+1) with m0 = q.
• Each user i ∈ S computes
ui,d = (yiMS\{i}M ′S,i) mod MS
where M ′S,i is the inverse of MS\{i} mod mi, and broadcasts
fi,d = gui,d mod p.
• The approximate value for gd mod p is computed as
Fd′ =
∏
i∈S
fi,d mod p.
Figure 4.4: CRT-based Joint-Exp-RSS procedure.
4.2.4 Computing gk
−1
mod p
In DSS, we need to compute r = gk
−1
mod p in such a way that neither k nor k−1
is known by any user. The Joint-Exp-Inverse procedure described in Fig. 4.5
computes r without revealing k.
Note that the (ja, jk) pair, 0 ≤ ja, jk ≤ 2t, found for (4.3) is unique with
overwhelming probability given that (2t+ 1)2  q.
4.2.5 The Overall Scheme
The phases of the proposed threshold DSS scheme are described below:
• Key Generation Phase: Let α ∈R Z∗q be the private signature key. The
dealer sets m0 = q and shares α
t↔ (α1, α2, . . . , αn).
• Signing Phase: To sign a hashed message w ∈ Zq, the signing coalition S
of size 2t+ 1 first computes
r = (gk
−1
mod p) mod q
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• S uses Joint-RSS to jointly share random secrets k t↔ (k1, k2, . . . , k2t+1), a t↔
(a1, a2, . . . , a2t+1), and uses Joint-ZS to distribute shares for zero, i.e., 0
2t↔
(z1, z2, . . . , z2t+1).
• S constructs v = ak from shares vi = (aiki + zi) mod mi, i ∈ S. Note that
v
2t+1↔ (v1, v2, . . . , v2t+1) by Propositions 4.1.1 and 4.1.2.
• S uses Joint-Exp-RSS to obtain
Fa′ =
∏
i∈S
fi,a =
∏
i∈S
gui,a ≡ ga′ ≡ ga+δaMS mod p,
Fk′ =
∏
i∈S
fi,k =
∏
i∈S
gui,k ≡ gk′ ≡ gk+δkMS mod p.
S also computes
Fa′k′ =
∏
i∈S
fi,ak =
∏
i∈S
Fa′
ui,k ≡ ga′k′ ≡ g(a+δaMS)(k+δkMS) mod p
≡ gvFa′δkMSFk′δaMSg−δaδkM2S mod p.
• S checks the following equality for all 0 ≤ ja, jk ≤ 2t
Fa′k′
?= gvFa′jkMSFk′jaMSg−jajkM
2
S mod p (4.3)
and finds the (ja = δa, jk = δk) pair that satisfies this equality. Once δa is found
Fa = ga mod p = Fa′g−δaMS mod p
can be computed.
• The signing coalition S computes
gk
−1
mod p = Fa(v
−1) mod p.
Figure 4.5: CRT-based Joint-Exp-Inverse procedure.
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by Joint-Exp-Inverse described in Fig. 4.5. To compute
s = k(w + rα) mod q,
each user i ∈ S computes
si = ki(w + rαi) mod mi
and broadcasts it. Then the signature s is computed by using the recon-
struction process for the Asmuth-Bloom SSS with 2t+ 1 shares.
• Verification Phase is the same as the standard DSS verification.
Since α is shared (t, n), the value α+Aαm0 is less than M and, r, w < q = m0.
Hence,
w + ry < m0 +m0 (α + Aαm0) < (m0 + 1)M
and a coalition of size t+1 is sufficient to compute w+ry and obtain w+rα mod q.
Since the threshold for the secret k is t, by Proposition 4.1.2, s
2t+1↔ (s1, s2, . . . , sn)
and s can be computed by 2t+ 1 partial signatures.
4.3 Security Analysis
Here we will prove that the proposed threshold DSS signature scheme is secure
(i.e. existentially non-forgeable against an adaptive chosen message attack), pro-
vided that the DSS signatures are unforgeable. Throughout the paper, we as-
sume a static adversary model where the adversary controls exactly t − 1 users
and chooses them at the beginning of the attack. In this model, the adversary
obtains all secret information of the corrupted users and the public parameters
of the cryptosystem. She can control the actions of the corrupted users, ask for
partial signatures of the messages of her choice, but she cannot corrupt another
user in the course of an attack, i.e., the adversary is static in that sense.
First we recall that the modified Asmuth-Bloom scheme is perfect:
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Theorem 4.3.1. The modified secret sharing scheme with the new M and equa-
tion (4.2) is perfect in the sense that the probabilities Pr(d = d′) and Pr(d = d′′)
are approximately equal for all d′, d′′ ∈ Zm0.
Proof. Let S ′ be a corrupted coalition of t− 1 users. For perfectness, we need to
check the value of M/MS′ which is
M
MS′
>
∏t
i=1 mi
n
∏t−1
i=1 mn−i+1
> m0
2
due to equation (4.2). Similar to the proof of Theorem 2.2.1, we can see that the
perfectness condition is preserved.
To reduce the problem of breaking the DSS signature scheme to breaking the
proposed threshold scheme, we will simulate the protocol with no information
on the secret where the output of the simulator is indistinguishable from the
adversary’s point of view. The input to the simulator is the hashed message w,
its signature (r, s), the public key β, the secret shares of the corrupted users, i.e.,
αi ∈ SB, where SB denotes the corrupted (bad) user set. Let SG be the set of
good users in S and let
r∗ = gms
−1
βrs
−1
mod p.
The actions of the simulator is described below:
1. By simulating the good users in SG, with Joint-RSS procedure, the sim-
ulator shares random values for each user in SG. It also obtains the good
users’ shares from the corrupted users in SB. Note that all of these values
are known by the simulator since |SG| ≥ t, which is the threshold. Let
a, k ∈ Zq be the shared values in this step, i.e., k t↔ (k1, k2, . . . , k2t+1)
and a
t↔ (a1, a2, . . . , a2t+1). After that, 0 is shared by using the procedure
Joint-ZS, i.e., 0
2t↔ (z1, z2, . . . , z2t+1). For the rest of the simulation, let
δa =
⌊∑
i∈S ui,a
MS
⌋
and δk =
⌊∑
i∈S ui,k
MS
⌋
.
2. By using the 2nd step in Fig. 4.5, v = ak is computed. Let Fa′ = r
∗vgδaMS .
The simulator uses ai values to compute fi,a = g
aiMS\iM ′S,i mod MS mod p for
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all i ∈ SG but one. For the last user, fi,a is selected such that
∏
i∈SG
fi,a ≡ Fa′
(∏
i∈SB
fi,a
)−1
mod p. (4.4)
These fi,a values are then broadcast.
3. By using the construction phase of Joint-Exp-RSS, Fk′ =
∏
i∈S fi,k mod p
is computed. Let
Fa′k′ = F ′a
δkMSFk′
δaMSg−δaδkM
2
Sgv mod p.
The simulator uses ki values to compute fi,ak = Fa′
kiMS\iM ′S,i mod MS mod p
for all i ∈ SG but one. For the last user, fi,ak is selected such that
∏
i∈SG
fi,ak ≡ Fa′k′
(∏
i∈SB
fi,ak
)−1
mod p.
These fi,ak values are then broadcasted. After that the correction phase is
completed.
4. Let si = ki (w + αir) mod q for i ∈ SB. The simulator chooses a random
integer Us smaller than M (m0 +m0M) such that Us ≡ si mod mi for i ∈
SB and Us ≡ s mod m0. Then it computes si = Us mod mi for i ∈ SG and
broadcasts them. After these steps, the signature (r, s) is computed.
To prove that the outcome of the simulator is indistinguishable, we first need
to state the following conjecture:
Conjecture 4.3.1 (Gennaro et al. [34]). Let G be the subgroup generated by
g. Choose u, v at random, uniformly distributed and independently in Zq. The
following probability distributions on G×G,
(gu mod p, gv mod p) and
(
gu mod p, gu
−1
mod p
)
are computationally indistinguishable.
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A similar assumption is also used in [60] to prove the security of the proposed
anonymous fingerprinting scheme. Also in [3], Bao et al. proved that if the
Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption holds there is no probabilistic
polynomial time Turing machine which outputs gx
−1
on inputs g and gx with
non-negligible probability. Note that the CDH assumption states that there is no
probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine which outputs gxy on inputs g, gx
and gy with non-negligible probability. The decisional version of CDH is called as
the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption. DDH states that the following
probability distributions on G×G×G,
(gu, gv, guv) and (gu, gv, gz)
are computationally indistinguishable where u, v, z are random, uniformly dis-
tributed and independent in Zq.
Lemma 4.3.2. The outcome of the simulator is indistinguishable from the CRT-
based threshold DSS signature from adversary’s point view.
Proof. The steps of the simulator are indistinguishable from the real execution
of the protocol as proved below:
1. As shown in Theorem 4.3.1 the modified SSS is perfect, i.e., the probabilities
Pr(d = k) and Pr(d = k) are approximately equal for k, k ∈ Zm0 where d is
the shared secret, k is the shared value in real protocol and k is the shared
value in the simulation. The same argument is also true for a.
2. In the real protocol, the set of shares (v1, v2, . . . , v2t+1) is a valid sharing
for a uniformly distributed value v. In the simulation, (v1, v2, . . . , v2t+1)
also yields a uniformly distributed value v. Hence, the distribution of the
shares vi, i ∈ S, is identical to the distribution of vi, i ∈ S. Note that, if
the joint zero-sharing procedure is not used, i.e., if the shares of v are not
randomized, the secrecy of a and k is not preserved.
In the real protocol, Fa′ = g
a+δaMS mod p where a is uniformly random and
δa is another random value independent from a. The simulation computes
Fa′ = g
k−1v+δaMS mod p. Since v is uniformly random, k−1v is also uniformly
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random. The simulator uses the exact δa value determined in Step 2 so its
distribution is identical to that of δa. Hence, the distribution of Fa′ and Fa′
values are identical.
In the simulation, ais are used to compute fi,a = g
aiMS\iM ′S,i mod MS mod p,
and in the computation of fi,a = g
ui,a , thanks to perfectness, the share ai
can be any integer from Zq. Hence, the distributions of fi,as and fi,as are
indistinguishable for the users in S \ {j}. However for the last user j of SG,
the simulator chooses a specific fj,a to satisfy equation (4.4). We will show
that without fj,a, the rest of the fi,as for i ∈ S \ {j} yield a random value
in the group generated by g. Let S ′ = S \ {j}. Consider∑
i∈S′
ui,a =
∑
i∈S′
aiMS\{i}M ′S,i mod MS.
Since the threshold for a is t and |S ′| > t, the following equation is satisfied:
a =
((∑
i∈S′
ui,a
)
mod MS′
)
mod q.
However, when we try to do the same construction in the exponent,∏
i∈S′
fi,a ≡ ga+∆aMS′ mod p
for some ∆a < |S ′| MSMS′ = |S
′|mj. Since, ∆a is an unknown, mj > m02 = q2,
and gcd (q,MS′) = 1, we have g
a+∆aMS′ uniformly random in the group
generated by g. Note that this is true for every S ′ ⊂ S, i.e., there is no
correlation between fi,as for i ∈ S ′ when ui,as are computed for a larger
coalition S ⊃ S ′. Therefore, in the simulation, the adversary cannot distin-
guish the inconsistency of the last user’s fj,a. Hence, the distributions of
fi,a and fi,a for i ∈ S are indistinguishable.
The same argument is also true for the distributions of fi,ak and fi,ak for
i ∈ S which are used in the following step.
3. For the correction phase in the real protocol, the values fi,ak and fi,k use
the same value ui,k in the exponent, likewise, the ones in the simulator. The
correction equation used in the real protocol is
Fa′k′ = Fa′
δkMSFk′
δaMSg−δaδkM
2
Sgv mod p.
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And, the simulator uses the value
Fa′k′ = Fa′
δkMSFk′
δaMSg−δaδkM
2
Sgv mod p
where the distribution of each value on the right side is identical to that
of the corresponding value in the real protocol. Hence the distribution of
Fa′k′ and Fa′k′ values are identical. The distributions of the outputs of the
correction processes, i.e., δa and δk, are also identical since the simulator
uses actual the δa and δk values.
Here we need to use the DDH assumption and Conjecture 4.3.1. After
the correction, Fa′ , Fk′ and Fa′k′ are revealed where in the real protocol
they are equal to ga
′
, gk
′
and ga
′k′ . The DDH assumption states that the
distributions of these triplets are indistinguishable. Besides, Fk′ = g
k′ and,
once δk is found, g
k can be computed. The users will also know r = gk
−1
and
in the real protocol the pair (gk, gk
−1
) will be (gk, gk
−1
). Conjecture 4.3.1
says that the distributions of these two pairs are also indistinguishable.
4. In the real protocol, the set of shares (s1, s2, . . . , s2t+1) is a valid sharing for
a uniformly distributed value s. In the simulation, (s1, s2, . . . , s2t+1) also
yields the same value. The computing process of si for i ∈ SG is the same
as the one in the real protocol. Hence, the distribution of the shares si,
i ∈ S, is identical to the distribution of si, i ∈ S.
We conclude this chapter with the following theorem, which is a corollary to
Theorem 4.3.1 and Lemma 4.3.2.
Corollary. Given that the standard DSS signature scheme is secure, the threshold
DSS signature scheme is also secure under the static adversary model.
Chapter 5
CRT-based Threshold Extensions
Secret and function sharing schemes can be enhanced by using various extensions.
In this chapter, we will propose a CRT-based verifiable secret sharing (VSS)
scheme and a proactive secret sharing (PSS) scheme. Also we will propose a
CRT-based robust function sharing scheme. To the best of our knowledge the
VSS and PSS schemes we propose are the first secure CRT-based SSSs. Besides,
the robustness extension designed for the threshold RSA scheme described in
Chapter 3 is the first one of its kind.
5.1 Verifiability
As described in Chapter 1, we call a SSS verifiable if each user can verify the
correctness of his share in the dealer phase and no user can lie about his share
in the combiner phase. Hence, neither the dealer nor the users can cheat in a
VSS scheme. Verifiable secret sharing schemes based on Shamir’s SSS have been
proposed in the literature [27, 59]. These schemes have been extensively studied
and used in threshold cryptography and secure multi-party computation [34, 58,
59].
There have been just two CRT-based VSS schemes by Iftene [40] and
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Qiong et al. [62]. In this section, we show that these schemes are vulnerable
to attacks where a corrupted dealer can distribute inconsistent shares without
detection such that different coalitions will obtain different values for the secret.
A typical application of a VSS scheme is the joint random secret shar-
ing (JRSS) primitive frequently used in threshold cryptography [34, 41, 58, 59].
In a JRSS scheme, all players act as a dealer and jointly generate and share a
random secret. A simple CRT based JRSS scheme was described in Fig. 4.2 which
does not use the verifiability feature.
In this section, we first show why existing attempts for a CRT-based verifiable
secret sharing scheme fail by attacks on the existing schemes. We then propose
a VSS scheme based on the Asmuth-Bloom secret sharing [2] and using this VSS
scheme, we propose a JRSS scheme.
5.1.1 Analysis of Existing CRT-based VSS Schemes
There have been two different approaches to achieve VSS by a CRT-based secret
sharing scheme. The first one, proposed by Iftene [40], obtains a VSS scheme
from Mignotte’s SSS [53] which is another CRT-based SSS similar to Asmuth-
Bloom. Here, we adapt Iftene’s approach to the Asmuth-Bloom SSS. The scheme
is given in Figure 5.1.
If the dealer is honest and the discrete logarithm problem is hard, the scheme
in Figure 5.1 is secure against a dishonest user because the verification data,
gi
y mod pi, can be used to detect an invalid share from a corrupted user in the
first step of the combiner phase.
However, if the dealer is dishonest, he can mount an attack despite the ad-
ditional verification data above: Let y be an integer and yi = y mod mi for
1 ≤ i ≤ n. In the combiner phase of Asmuth-Bloom SSS, the minimum number
of users required to obtain the secret is t; hence, y = d + Am0 must be smaller
than M =
∏t
i=1 mi. Note that, to reconstruct the secret d, each coalition S must
first compute y mod MS where MS ≥ M . If the dealer distributes the shares
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• Dealer Phase: To share a secret d ∈ Zm0 among a group of n users with verifiable
shares, the dealer does the following:
1. Use the dealing procedure of the Asmuth-Bloom SSS to obtain the shares
yi = y mod mi for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n where y = d + Am0 < M . Choose mis
such that each pi = 2mi + 1 is also a prime.
2. Let gi ∈ Z∗pi be an element of order mi. The dealer sends yi to the ith
user privately and makes the values pi, gi and zi = g
y
i mod pi public for
1 ≤ i ≤ n. The ith user can find whether his share is valid or not by
checking
zi
?= giyi mod pi. (5.1)
• Combiner Phase: Let S be a coalition gathered to construct the secret.
1. The share yi of user i ∈ S can be verified by the other users in S by the
verification equation zi
?= giyi mod pi.
2. If all shares are valid then the coalition S can obtain the secret d: First,
the ith user computes
ui = yiM ′S,iMS\{i} mod MS .
3. Then the users compute
y =
(∑
i∈S
ui
)
mod MS
and obtain the secret d by computing d = y mod m0.
Figure 5.1: Iftene’s CRT-based VSS extension.
for some y > M , then y will be greater than MS for some coalition S of size
t. Hence, S may not compute the correct y value and the correct secret d even
though yi = y mod mi for all i. Therefore, the given VSS scheme cannot detect
this kind of inconsistent shares from the dealer where different coalitions end up
with different d values. The same problem also arises in Iftene’s original VSS
scheme [40].
Another VSS scheme based on Asmuth-Bloom secret sharing was proposed
by Qiong et al. [62]. Their approach is similar to the VSS of Pedersen [59] based
on Shamir’s SSS. Their scheme is given in Figure 5.2.
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• Dealer Phase: To share a secret d ∈ Zm0 among a group of n users with verifiable
shares, the dealer does the following:
1. Use the dealing procedure of the Asmuth-Bloom SSS to obtain the shares
yi = y mod mi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n where y = d+Am0 < M .
2. Let p, q be primes such that q|(p − 1). Construct the unique polynomial
f(x) ∈ Zq[x] where deg(f(x)) = n−1 and f(mi) = yi. Construct a random
polynomial f ′(x) ∈ Zq[x] where deg(f ′(x)) = n− 1. Let zi = f ′(mi) for all
1 ≤ i ≤ n.
3. Let g ∈ Zp with order q, h be a random integer in the group generated by
g and E(a, b) = gahb mod p for inputs a, b ∈ Z∗q . Compute
Ei = E(fi, f ′i) = g
fihf
′
i mod p,
where fi and f ′i are the (i−1)th coefficients of f(x) and f ′(x), respectively,
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Broadcast Eis to all users.
4. Send (yi, zi) secretly to the ith user for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
5. Each user checks
E(yi, zi)
?≡
n∏
j=1
Ej
mi
j−1 ≡
n∏
j=1
gfjmi
j−1
n∏
j=1
hf
′
jmi
j−1
≡ gyihzi (mod p) (5.2)
to verify the validity of his share.
• Combiner Phase: Let S be a coalition gathered to construct the secret.
1. The share (yi, zi) of user i ∈ S can be verified by the other users in S with
the verification equality E(yi, zi)
?≡∏nj=1Ejmij−1 (mod p).
2. If all shares are valid; the coalition S can obtain the secret d by using the
reconstruction procedure described in Section 2.1.
Figure 5.2: Qiong et al.’s CRT-based VSS extension.
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As the scheme shows, Qiong et al. treated the shares of Asmuth-Bloom SSS
as points on a degree-(n− 1) polynomial and adopted the approach of Pedersen
by evaluating the polynomial in the exponent to verify the shares. If the dealer
is honest, the scheme in Figure 5.2 is secure because the verification data can
be used to detect an invalid share from a corrupted user in the first step of the
combiner phase.
However, similar to the attack on Iftene’s VSS scheme, if the dealer uses some
y > M and computes the verification data by using the shares yi = y mod mi,
1 ≤ i ≤ n, the verification equation (5.2) holds for each user. But, for a coalition
S where y > MS, the coalition S cannot compute the correct y value and the
secret d.
Note that Iftene’s VSS scheme uses a separate verification data for each user;
hence even if all the verification equations hold, the secret can still be inconsistent
for different coalitions. Quiong et al.’s VSS scheme generates a polynomial f(x)
from the shares as in Feldman’s and Pedersen’s VSS schemes. This polynomial is
used to check all verification equations. But Asmuth-Bloom SSS scheme depends
on the CRT and unlike Shamir’s SSS, here f is not inherently related to the
shares. Hence, even if all the equations hold, the shares can still be inconsistent
as we have shown.
5.1.2 Verifiable Secret Sharing with Asmuth-Bloom SSS
As discussed in Section 5.1.1, existing CRT-based VSS schemes in the literature
cannot prevent a dealer from cheating. To solve this problem, we will use a range
proof technique originally proposed by Boudot [11] and modified by Cao et al. [14].
5.1.2.1 Range Proof Techniques
Boudot [11] proposed an efficient and non-interactive technique to prove that a
committed number lies within an interval. He used the Fujisaki-Okamoto com-
mitment scheme [31], where the commitment of a number y with bases (g, h) is
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computed as
E = E(y, r) = gyhr mod N
where g is an element in Z∗N , h is an element of the group generated by g, and r is
a random integer. As proved in [11, 31], this commitment scheme is statistically
secure assuming the factorization of N is not known.
After Boudot, Cao et al. [14] applied the same proof technique with a different
commitment scheme
E = E(y) = gy mod N
to obtain shorter range proofs. Here, we will use Cao et al.’s non-interactive range-
proof scheme as a black box. For further details, we refer the user to [11, 14].
For our needs, we modified the commitment scheme as
E = E(y) = gy mod PN
where P =
∏n
i=1 pi and N is an RSA composite whose factorization is secret.
Note that even if φ(P ) is known, φ(PN) cannot be computed since φ(N) is
secret. Throughout the section, we will use RngPrf(E(y),M) to denote the range
proof that a secret integer y committed with E(y) is in the interval [0,M).
5.1.2.2 A CRT-based VSS Scheme
In our VSS scheme, the RSA composite N is an integer generated jointly by the
users and the dealer where its prime factorization is not known. Such an integer
satisfying these constraints can be generated by using the protocols proposed for
shared RSA key generation [10, 30] at the beginning of the protocol. Note that
we do not need the private and the public RSA exponents in our VSS scheme
as in the original protocols [10, 30]; hence those parts of the protocols can be
omitted.
Quisquater et al. [63] showed that when mis are chosen as consecutive primes,
the scheme has better security properties. For CRT-based VSS, we will also
assume that all mis are prime and we will choose them such that pi = 2mi + 1 is
also a prime for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
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Let gi ∈ Z∗pi be an element of order mi. Let P =
∏n
i=1 pi and
g =
(
n∑
i=1
giP
′
i
P
pi
)
mod P (5.3)
where P ′i =
(
P
pi
)−1
mod pi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, i.e., g is the unique integer in ZP
satisfying gi = g mod pi for all i. Our VSS scheme is described in Figure 5.3.
• Dealer Phase: To share a secret d ∈ Zm0 among a group of n users with verifiable
shares, the dealer does the following:
1. Use the dealing procedure of the Asmuth-Bloom secret sharing scheme de-
scribed in Section 2.1 to obtain the shares
yi = y mod mi
for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n where y = d+Am0 < M =
∏t
i=1mi. Note that the mis
are large primes where pi = 2mi + 1 is also a prime for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
2. Let N be an integer whose prime factorization is not known by the users
and the dealer. Compute E(y) = gy mod PN . Send yi to the ith user
secretly for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and broadcast (E(y),RngPrf(E(y),M)).
3. The ith user checks
gi
yi ?≡ E(y) (mod pi) (5.4)
to verify yi = y mod mi. Then he checks the validity of the range proof to
verify y < M .
• Combiner Phase: Let S be a coalition gathered to construct the secret.
1. The share yi of user i ∈ S can be verified by the other users in S with the
verification equality giyi
?≡ E(y) (mod pi).
2. If all shares are valid, the participants can obtain the secret d by using the
reconstruction procedure described in Section 2.1. Otherwise, the corrupted
users are disqualified.
Figure 5.3: CRT-based verifiable secret sharing scheme.
5.1.2.3 Analysis of the Proposed VSS Scheme
We analyze the correctness of the scheme and its security against passive and
active attackers below:
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5.1.2.4 Correctness
Aside from the verification equation, the scheme uses the original Asmuth-Bloom
scheme. Hence, for correctness, we only need to show that when the dealer and
the users are honest, the verification equations in the dealer and combiner phases
hold. Note that, the condition y < M is checked in Step 3 of the dealer phase by
using RngPrf(E(y),M)). Furthermore, for a valid share yi,
E(y) mod pi = g
y mod PN mod pi
= gy mod pi
= gi
y mod pi
= gi
yi mod pi.
Hence if the dealer and the users behave honestly, the verification equation holds
and the ith user verifies that his share is a residue modulo mi of the integer
y < M committed with E(y).
5.1.2.5 Security Analysis
For the security analysis, we will first show that the VSS is perfect, i.e., no
coalition of size smaller than t can obtain any information about the secret.
Theorem 5.1.1. For a passive adversary with t − 1 shares in the VSS scheme,
every candidate for the secret is equally likely, i.e., the probabilities Pr(d = d′)
and Pr(d = d′′) are approximately equal for all d′, d′′ ∈ Zm0.
Proof. First we recall that the underlying SSS is perfect due to Theorem 2.2.1.
Hence, given t − 1 shares, all secret candidates are equally likely. Besides the
shares, the only additional information a corrupted user can obtain is E(y)
and RngPrf(E(y),M). Given that the discrete logarithm problem is hard and
CHAPTER 5. CRT-BASED THRESHOLD EXTENSIONS 56
Cao et al.’s range proof technique is computationally secure, the proposed VSS
scheme is also computationally secure.
The shares distributed by a dealer are said to be inconsistent if different
coalitions of size at least t obtain different values for the secret. The following
theorem proves that the dealer cannot distribute shares inconsistent with the
secret.
Theorem 5.1.2. A corrupted dealer cannot cheat in the VSS scheme without
being detected. I.e., if the shares are inconsistent with the secret d then at least
one verification equation does not hold.
Proof. Let U = {1, . . . , n} be the set of all users. If the shares are inconsistent,
for two coalitions S and S ′ with |S|, |S ′| ≥ t,(∑
i∈S
yiM
′
S,iMS\{i}
)
mod MS 6=
(∑
i∈S′
yiM
′
S′,iMS′\{i}
)
mod MS′ .
hence,
y =
(
n∑
i=1
yiM
′
U,iMU\{i}
)
mod MU > M.
If this is true then the dealer cannot provide a valid range proof RngPrf(E(y),M).
So, when a user tries to verify that y < M , the range proof will not be verified.
If the dealer tries to use a different y′ 6= y value in the commitment E(y′) and
generates a valid proof RngPrf(E(y′),M), the verification equation (5.4) will not
hold for some user i.
Hence, the VSS scheme guarantees that the n distributed shares are consistent
and they are residues of some number y < M .
Theorem 5.1.3. A user cannot cheat in the VSS scheme without being detected;
i.e., if a share given in the combiner phase is inconsistent with the secret, then
the verification equation does not hold.
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Proof. When a user i sends an incorrect share y′i 6= yi = y mod mi in the combiner
phase, the verification equation
E(y)
?≡ giyi (mod pi)
will not hold because E(y) = gy mod PN , pi|P and since the order of gi ∈ Zpi is
mi, the only value that satisfies the verification equation is yi.
Therefore, we can say that the scheme is secure for up to t−1 corrupted users
and no participant can cheat in any phase of the scheme.
5.1.3 Verifiable Joint Random Secret Sharing
As described above, JRSS protocols enable a group of users to jointly generate
and share a secret where a trusted dealer is not available. Here we describe a
JRSS scheme based on the VSS scheme described above. We first modify (2.2)
used in the Asmuth-Bloom secret sharing scheme in Section 2.1 as
t∏
i=1
mi > nm0
2
t−1∏
i=1
mn−i+1. (5.5)
We also change the definition of M as M =
⌊
(
∏t
i=1 mi)/n
⌋
. The proposed JRSS
scheme is given in Figure 5.4.
5.1.3.1 Analysis of the Proposed JRSS Scheme
5.1.3.2 Correctness
Observe that when all users behave honestly, the JRSS scheme works correctly.
Let y =
∑
i∈B y
(i). It is easy to see that y <
∏t
i=1mi since y
(i) < M for all i ∈ B,
where |B| ≤ n and M = ⌊(∏ti=1mi)/n⌋. One can see that yj = y mod mj for all
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• Dealing Phase: To jointly share a secret d ∈ Zm0 the users do the following:
1. Each user chooses a secret di ∈ Zm0 and shares it by using the VSS scheme
as follows: He first computes
y(i) = di +Aim0
where y(i) < M =
⌊
(
∏t
i=1mi)/n
⌋
. Then the secret for the jth user is
computed as
y
(i)
j = y
(i) mod mj .
He sends y(i)j to user j secretly for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and broadcasts
(E(y(i)),RngPrf(E(y(i)),M)).
2. After receiving shares the jth user verifies them by using the verification
procedure in (5.4). Let B be the set of users whose shares are verified
correctly. The jth user computes his overall share
yj =
(∑
i∈B
y
(i)
j
)
mod mj
by using the verified shares.
• Combiner Phase: Let S be a coalition of t users gathered to construct the secret.
1. The share yi of user i ∈ S can be verified by the other users in S with the
verification equation,
gyi
?≡
∏
j∈B
E(y(j))
 (mod pi). (5.6)
2. If all shares are valid, the participants obtain the secret
d =
(∑
i∈B
di
)
mod m0
by using the reconstruction procedure described in Section 2.1.
Figure 5.4: CRT-based verifiable joint random secret sharing scheme.
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j ∈ B by checking
y mod mj =
(∑
i∈B
y(i)
)
mod mj
=
(∑
i∈B
y
(i)
j
)
mod mj
= yj mod mj = yj.
Hence, each yi satisfies yi = y mod mi and y <
∏t
i=1mi; so, y can be constructed
with t shares.
For correctness of the verification procedure in (5.6), one can observe that(∏
i∈B
E(y(i))
)
mod pi = g
∑
i∈B y
(i)
mod pi
= gy mod pi = gi
y mod pi
= gi
yi mod pi.
Hence, when every user behaves honestly, the proposed JRSS scheme works cor-
rectly.
5.1.3.3 Security
We will show that no coalition of size smaller than t can obtain any information
about the secret.
Theorem 5.1.4. For a passive adversary with t− 1 shares in the JRSS scheme,
every candidate for the secret is equally likely. I.e., the probabilities Pr(d = d′)
and Pr(d = d′′) are approximately equal for all d′, d′′ ∈ Zm0.
Proof. Suppose the adversary corrupts t − 1 users and just observes the inputs
and outputs of the corrupted users without controlling their actions, i.e., the
adversary is honest in user actions but curious about the secret. Let S ′ be the
coalition of the users corrupted by the adversary. The shares are obtained when
each user shares his partial secret di, i.e., the adversary will obtain t−1 share for
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each di. We will prove that the probabilities that di = d
′
i and d = d
′′
i are almost
equal for two secret candidates d′i, d
′′
i ∈ Zm0 .
We already proved that the Asmuth-Bloom SSS described in Section 2.1 is
perfect with equation (2.2). By using the shares of S ′, the adversary can compute
y′(i) = y(i) mod MS′ . But even with these shares, there are MMS′ consistent y
(i)s
which are smaller than M and congruent to y′(i) modulo MS′ . By replacing (2.2)
with (5.5) and changing the definition of M to
⌊
(
∏t
i=1 mi)/n
⌋
, the value of the
ratio
M
MS′
>
M∏t−1
i=1 mn−i+1
≈
∏t
i=1 mi
n
∏t−1
i=1 mn−i+1
is greater than m0
2. Hence, even with t− 1 shares, there are still m02 candidates
for each y(i) which is used to share the secret di. Since gcd(m0,MS′) = 1, there
are approximately m0 y
(i)s, consistent with a secret candidate d′i. Hence, for a
secret candidate d′i the probability that di = d
′
i is approximately equal to
1
m0
and
the perfectness of the scheme is preserved.
Besides the shares, the only other information the adversary can observe is
the commitments and range proofs. Given that the discrete logarithm problem
is hard and Cao et al.’s range proof scheme is secure, the proposed JRSS scheme
is also computationally secure.
A corrupted user cannot cheat in the JRSS scheme without being detected.
Since we are using a VSS scheme, while user i is sharing his partial secret di,
the conditions of the Asmuth-Bloom SSS must be satisfied as proved in Theo-
rem 5.1.2. Furthermore, if user i sends an incorrect share in the combiner phase,
the verification equation (5.6) will not hold. As a result, we can say that the
JRSS scheme is secure for up to t − 1 corrupted users and no user can cheat in
any phase of the scheme.
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5.2 Proactivity
Another important extension in threshold cryptography is the proactivity feature
of the secret sharing schemes. With this feature, a SSS has the capability of
renewing the shares of the users without changing the long term secret such that
any shares obtained by a corrupted party becomes obsolete. So far, no CRT-based
proactive secret sharing (PSS) schemes have been proposed in the literature. By
combining and extending the ideas used in the VSS and JRSS schemes described
in Section 5.1, we propose a PSS scheme in this section.
Proactive SSS protocols enable the shareholders to jointly renew their shares
without changing and revealing the long-term secret. By this feature, the shares
compromised by an adversary can be made obsolete with the update process.
Proactive secret sharing schemes are investigated by several researchers and var-
ious schemes have been proposed in the literature [19, 39, 55].
In a proactive SSS, at the end of a certain time period τ , first the corrupted
users are identified in the detection procedure and then all such users are rebooted,
i.e., the adversary is removed from the computers of the users and all of the past
information is erased. Subsequently, the new shares of the rebooted users are
recovered in the recovery procedure. Then, the shares of the remaining users
are refreshed by a renewal procedure. At the end of this protocol, the long-term
secret remains the same although the shares of the users for the next period are
renewed. This update phase is repeated periodically at the end of each time
period.
Adversary model: We assume the mobile adversary model of Herzberg et al.
[39]. In this model, the adversary is allowed to move among players and can
corrupt users at any time. The only restriction on the adversary is that he
cannot corrupt more than t− 1 distinct users in a time period where t < n/2 is
the threshold of the secret sharing scheme and n is the number of users. If a user
is corrupted during the course of the update phase executed at the end of time
period τ , he is considered corrupted for both time periods τ and τ + 1. With this
model, Herzberg at al. proposed an efficient and secure Shamir based proactive
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SSS.
We use Aτ to denote the set of users where an adversarial behavior is detected
in their actions in time period τ and Bτ to denote the set of remaining users. A
user is disqualified and becomes a member of Aτ if his share is inconsistent with
the secret or if he tries to cheat in the share update phase. Each disqualified
user is rebooted at the beginning of the update phase, i.e., all the information
including the secret share is erased, hence the new share of a corrupted user must
be recovered by the users in Bτ .
5.2.1 CRT-based Proactive Secret Sharing Scheme
To obtain a proactive SSS, we first modify the equation (2.1) used in the Asmuth-
Bloom secret sharing scheme in Section 2.1 as
t∏
i=1
mi > nm0
3
t−1∏
i=1
mn−i+1. (5.7)
We also change the definition of M as
M =
⌊∏t
i=1 mi
nm0
⌋
.
In the proposed proactive sharing scheme, first a secret is shared by a dealer
as described in Figure 5.5 by using the VSS scheme proposed in Section 5.1.2.
Dealer Phase: The dealer shares a secret d ∈ Zm0 by equation (5.7) and M , using
the VSS scheme proposed in Section 5.1.2. Similar to the VSS, let pi = 2mi+1 be
a prime for 0 ≤ i ≤ n. As in the VSS, y = d+Am0 is an integer smaller than M ,
yi = y mod mi is the share of user i, and the commitment E(y) = gy mod PN is
broadcast with the range proof for y.
Figure 5.5: CRT-based proactive SSS: The dealer phase.
The share update phase executed at the end of a time period τ has three
phases:
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1. Detection: If a user j is detected as corrupted he is rebooted and becomes
a member of Aτ .
2. Share Recovery : The share of each rebooted user j ∈ Aτ is reconstructed
by the remaining users in Bτ .
3. Share Renewal : The users jointly share 0 by setting di = 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
in the JRSS protocol of Figure 5.4. Then they add these renewal shares to
their previous ones and obtain their new shares.
5.2.1.1 Detection
If a user does not participate in a protocol where he is an active member, or
if the information he sends does not verify correctly we say that an adversarial
action is detected. However, when an adversary silently corrupts some users by
only modifying their local data, we cannot detect such inconsistencies after the
adversary detaches himself from the user. Hence, to protect proactiveness, we
need to periodically test the correctness of users’ local data. To do this, we will
use the E(y) values each player holds as in Figure 5.6.
Note that t < n/2 hence there are at least t honest users who had not been
silently or actively corrupted by an adversary. Since the views of all honest users
are the same, an inconsistent value will be detected by at least t users.
5.2.1.2 Share Recovery
At the beginning of the update phase, the shares of the rebooted users will still
be missing. To recover the share of a rebooted user j ∈ Aτ−1, each user Bτ−1
shares a random multiple of mj ∈ [0,M); hence the sum of these shared values,
which will be denoted by z, will be a multiple of mj. This ensures that when
the users in Bτ−1 add their old shares for y by the new ones, they obtain a share
for an integer y′ = y + z where yj ≡ y ≡ y′ (mod mj). After obtaining a share
for y′, each user in Bτ−1 sends it to the jth user via a private channel so the jth
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1. Let E(i)(y) denotes the local copy of the commitment E(y) for user i.
For detection, the ith user first checks the validity of his share by using
the equation
yi
?= E(i)(y) mod pi.
If the equation is not satisfied he broadcasts an inconsistency warning,
reboots himself and becomes a member of Aτ .
2. If the equation is satisfied, after receiving each E(i)(y) for i ∈ Bτ , the
jth user tries to find an inconsistency
E(i1)(y) 6= E(i2)(y)
for i1, i2 ∈ Bτ and he broadcast an accusation either for user i1, i2 or
both, depending which is inconsistent with at least t E(i)(y)s.
3. If at least t accusations are broadcasted for a user i, he is rebooted with
the users who did not accuse him.
Figure 5.6: CRT-based proactive SSS: The detection procedure.
user can compute y′ and hence yj. This share recovery procedure is described in
detail in Figure 5.7.
5.2.1.3 Share Renewal
After the recovery procedure, each user i ∈ Bτ has a share yi = y mod mi where
y = d+Am0 < M . The idea used in this phase is similar to the one in the JRSS
scheme described in Section 5.1.3. Instead of a random secret, each user shares 0
by some y(i) ≡ 0 (mod m0), y(i) ∈ [0,M), hence the overall shared value will be
a multiple of m0. So, when a user adds his renewal shares with his old share yi,
he obtains a new share y′′i , which is a residue of an integer y
′′ ∈ [0,∏ti=1mi) such
that d = y′′ mod m0. In the next time period, y′′ will be the new y. The share
renewal procedure is described in Figure 5.8.
Note that y will remain less than
∏t
i=1mi provided that m0, which is a very
large integer, is greater than the number of times the update procedure is applied,
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1. To recover the share of a compromised user j ∈ Aτ each user i ∈ Bτ
chooses an integer
y(i,j) = Aimj
where Ai is a random integer such that y(i,j) < M and then shares it
among Bτ by computing the secrets
y
(i,j)
k = y
(i,j) mod mk
for each user k ∈ Bτ . He sends y(i,j)k to user k secretly and broadcasts
(E(y(i,j)),RngPrf(E(y(i,j)),M)).
2. After receiving the shares y(i,j)k from each i ∈ Bτ , the kth player ver-
ifies them by using the verification procedure in equation (5.4). Also
each commitment is checked by E(y(i,j)) mod pj
?= 1. If a verification
equation does not hold for a user, he is disqualified.
3. The kth user computes his ephemeral secret
y′k =
(
yk +
∑
i∈Bτ
y
(i,j)
k
)
mod mk
and sends it to user j secretly.
4. After receiving the shares, y′ks, from each user k ∈ Bτ , the jth player
verifies them by using the verification procedure in equation (5.4) for y′.
The verification data for y′ = y +
∑
i∈Bτ y
(i,j) can be computed as
E(y′) = E(y)
∏
i∈Bτ
E(y(i,j)).
If a verification equation does not hold for a user, he is disqualified for
time period τ and τ + 1.
5. The compromised user jth computes
y′ =
∑
k∈Bτ
y′kM
′
Bτ ,kMBτ\{k} mod MBτ
where MBτ\{k}M
′
Bτ ,k ≡ 1 (mod mk). He computes his share as yj =
y′ mod mj .
Figure 5.7: CRT-based proactive SSS: The share recovery procedure.
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1. Each user i in Bτ shares 0 by first computing
y(i) = Aim0
where Ai is a random integer such that y(i) < M . Then he computes
the share for user j ∈ Bτ as
y
(i)
j = y
(i) mod mj .
He sends y(i)j to each user j secretly and broadcasts(
E(y(i)),RngPrf(E(y(i)),M)
)
.
2. After receiving the shares y(i)j for i ∈ Bτ , the jth user verifies them
by using the verification procedure in equation (5.4). Besides, each
commitment is checked for E(y(i))
?≡ 1 (mod p0). If the verification
equation of user i does not hold, he is disqualified, i.e., he is moved from
Bτ to Aτ and Aτ+1. The jth user updates his overall share as
y′′j =
(
yj +
∑
i∈Bτ
y
(i)
j
)
mod mj .
3. The new verification data for y′′ = y +
∑
i∈Bτ y
(i) is computed as
E(y′′) = E(y)
∏
i∈Bτ
E(y(i)).
Figure 5.8: CRT-based proactive SSS: The share renewal procedure.
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since y(i) < M , |Bτ | < n, and
m0
∑
i∈Bτ
y(i) < nm0M = nm0
⌊∏t
i=1mi
nm0
⌋
≤
t∏
i=1
mi.
5.2.2 Security Analysis
Assume that the update phase is started at the end of the τth time period. In the
share recovery procedure, the participants share z which is equivalent to 0 modulo
mj for a rebooted user j. Also, in the share renewal procedure, the participants
jointly share y′′ − y, where y′′ is the new shared integer and y is the previous
one. With the following theorems, we will prove that the perfectness condition
is preserved in the dealing phase and the shared integers in the next two phases
are not computable by a passive adversary.
Theorem 5.2.1. The modified secret sharing scheme with the new
M =
⌊∏t
i=1 mi
nm0
⌋
and equation (5.7) is perfect in the sense that the probabilities Pr(d = d′) and
Pr(d = d′′) are approximately equal for all d′, d′′ ∈ Zm0.
Proof. Let S ′ be a corrupted coalition of t− 1 users. For perfectness, we need to
check the value of M/MS′ which is
M
MS′
>
∏t
i=1 mi
nm0
∏n
i=n−t+1mi
> m0
2
due to equation (5.7). Similar to the proof of Theorem 2.2.1, we can say that the
perfectness condition is preserved.
Lemma 5.2.2. For a passive adversary that has corrupted t − 2 users in the
recovery procedure, there are at least m0
2 possible candidates for each y(i,j) used.
Proof. Let S ′ be the set of t− 2 corrupted users. In the recovery procedure, first
each user i shares a y(i,j) where adversary has t− 2 shares for each of them, i.e.,
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y
(i,j)
k for k ∈ S ′ \ {j}. So, for a shared value y(i,j), the adversary can only have
the shares of S ′ and an additional information that y(i,j) ≡ 0 (mod mj). Hence,
although the adversary can obtain y(i,j) mod MS′ , there are still
M
MS′
=
∏t
i=1 mi
nm0MS′
> m0
2
candidates for y(i,j) since y(i,j) < M .
Lemma 5.2.3. Let j be the rebooted user whose share is being recovered in the
recovery procedure. For a passive adversary that has corrupted t−1 users including
j, there are at least m0
2 possible values for each uncompromised yi, the secret
share of user i.
Proof. In Step 3 of the recovery procedure described in Figure 5.7, an honest user
i computes his ephemeral secret
y′i =
(
yi +
∑
k∈Bτ
y
(k,j)
i
)
mod mi
and sends it to user j who has been corrupted by the adversary. Note that yi is
masked with y
(k,j)
i s where
y
(k,j)
i = y
(k,j) mod mi,
and due to Lemma 5.2.2, from the adversary’s point of view there are at least
m0
2 candidates, with the same remainder in modulo MS′ , for each y
(k,j). Hence
there are at least m0
2 candidates for each y
(k,j)
i since (mi,MS′) = 1. This also
proves that there are at least m0
2 candidates for yi = d+ Am0 mod mi.
Theorem 5.2.4. For a passive adversary in the recovery procedure, two secrets
d′, d′′ ∈ Zm0 are equally likely.
Proof. Let j be the rebooted user whose share is being recovered. Since user j
was corrupted in time period τ , the adversary can have at most t− 2 additional
users corrupted in the recovery procedure. Beside these t−2 users, the adversary
is allowed to corrupt only the jth user again. Due to the mobile adversary model
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this is the best the adversary can do. Let S ′ be the set of t − 1 corrupted users
including user j.
From Lemma 5.2.3, we know that there are at least m0
2 candidates for yi =
d+Am0 mod mi. Since gcd(m0,mi) = 1 these m0
2 candidates covers all m0 secret
candidates at least m0 times. Hence, all secret candidates are equally likely.
Lemma 5.2.5. For a passive adversary that has corrupted t−1 users in the share
renewal procedure, there are at least m0 possible candidates for each y
(i).
Proof. Assume that the adversary corrupted t− 1 users in time period τ without
being detected. Let S ′ denote this set of corrupted users. Considering M ≈
(
∏t
i=1mi)/(nm0) we know that
M =
∏t
i=1mi
nm0
> m0
2
t−1∏
i=1
mn−i+1 > m02MS′
due to equation (5.7).
For a shared value y(i) = Aim0, the adversary will know that y
(i) ≡
0 (mod m0). Since y
(i) < M , there are M
m0
> m0MS′ candidates for y
(i) ≡
0 (mod m0). Besides, the adversary can compute y
(i) mod MS′ by using the t−1
shares he obtained for y(i). But, there are still M
m0MS′
> m0 candidates for y
(i).
Theorem 5.2.6. An adversary with t− 1 corrupted shares in the share renewal
procedure cannot compute a new share in time period τ + 1 from an old share he
has from time period τ .
Proof. In Step 2 of the renewal procedure describe in Figure 5.8, the jth user
updates his overall share as
y′′j =
(
yj +
∑
i∈Bτ
y
(i)
j
)
mod mj.
From Lemma 5.2.5, there is at least m0 possible candidates for y
(i) and
gcd(mj,m0MS′) = 1. Hence, there are at least m0 possible candidates for each
y
(i)
j = y
(i) mod mj.
Hence, the adversary cannot compute y′′j even if he knows the old share yj.
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By Theorems 5.2.4 and 5.2.6, the proposed PSS scheme is secure against
passive adversaries in Herzberg et al.’s mobile adversary model.
5.2.2.1 Security Analysis for an Active Adversary
As proved in Sections 5.1.2.5 and 5.1.3.3, in the proposed VSS and JRSS schemes,
if a user tries to cheat by sending inconsistent information he will be detected
easily since some verification equations will not hold.
In the share renewal and share recovery phases, we use modified versions of the
JRSS scheme where the shared values are congruent to 0 with respect to moduli
m0 and mj, respectively, where user j has been rebooted before the execution of
the update phase. To verify these restrictions, in the 2nd step of Figure 5.8, a user
j verifies his share for y(i) by using the verification procedure in equation (5.4)
and checks
E(y(i))
?≡ 1 (mod p0).
Also in the 2nd step of Figure 5.7, a user k verifies his share for y(i,j) by using
the verification procedure in equation 5.4 and checks
E(y(i,j))
?≡ 1 (mod pj).
Note that the other restrictions are also verified since they are automatically
checked by the proposed VSS scheme. Therefore, an active adversary cannot
send an inconsistent data without being detected.
5.3 Robustness
We say that a function sharing scheme is robust if it can withstand participation
of corrupt users in the function evaluation phase. In a robust FSS, a detection
mechanism is used to identify the corrupted partial results so that, the corrupted
users can be eliminated. The FSSs proposed in Chapters 3 and 4 do not have
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the robustness property and, to the best of our knowledge, no CRT-based robust
and secure function sharing scheme exists in the literature.
In this section, we investigate how CRT-based threshold schemes can be en-
hanced with the robustness property. We first give a robust threshold function
sharing scheme for the RSA cryptosystem. Then we apply the ideas to the ElGa-
mal and Paillier decryption functions. For RSA and Paillier, we use the threshold
schemes proposed in Chapter 3. For ElGamal, we work with a modified version
of the ElGamal decryption scheme by Wei et al. [72]. All of the proposed schemes
are provably secure against a static adversary under the random oracle model [5].
In achieving robustness, we make use of a non-interactive protocol designed to
prove equality of discrete logarithms [11, 15, 68]. The original interactive protocol
was proposed by Chaum et al [15] and improved by Chaum and Pedersen [16].
Later, Shoup [68] and, Boudot and Traore´ [12] developed a non-interactive version
of the protocol.
In the original Asmuth-Bloom scheme, m0 is not needed until the last step of
the combiner phase but still it is a public value. To avoid confusion, we emphasize
that it will be secret for the robust FSSs proposed in this section.
5.3.1 Robust Sharing of the RSA Function
To enhance the threshold cryptosystems with the robustness property, we use
a non-interactive protocol proposed to prove equality of two discrete logarithms
with respect to different moduli. The interactive protocol, which was originally
proposed by Chaum et al [15] for the same moduli, was modified by Shoup and
used to make a threshold RSA signature scheme robust [68]. He used Shamir’s
SSS as the underlying SSS to propose a practical and robust threshold RSA sig-
nature scheme. In Shamir’s SSS, the secret is reconstructed by using Lagrange’s
polynomial evaluation formula and all participants use the same modulus which
does not depend on the coalition. On the other hand, in the direct solution
used in the the CRT-based threshold RSA scheme described in Section 3.1, the
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definition of
ui =
(
yiM
′
S,i mod mi
)
MS\{i}
shows that we need different moduli for each user. For robustness, we need
to check the correctness of ui for each user i in the function evaluation
phase. We modified the protocol in [68] for the case of different moduli as
Boudot and Traore´ [11] did to obtain efficient publicly verifiable secret sharing
schemes.
To obtain robustness, we first modify the dealer phase of the Asmuth-Bloom
SSS and add the constraint that
pi = 2mi + 1
be a prime for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n. These values will be the moduli used to con-
struct/verify the proof of correctness for each user. The robustness extension
described below can be used to make the CRT-based threshold RSA signature
scheme in Section 3.1 robust. We only give the additions for the robustness
extension here since the other phases are the same.
• Setup: Use Asmuth-Bloom SSS for sharing d with m0 = φ(N). Let gi be
an element of order mi in Z∗pi . Broadcast gi and the public verification data
vi = gi
yi mod pi
for each user i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
• Generating the proof of correctness : Let w be the hashed message to be
signed and suppose the range of the hash function is Z∗N . Assume a coalition
S of size t participated in the signing phase. Let h : {0, 1}∗ → {0, . . . , 2L1−
1} be a hash function where L1 is another security parameter. Let
w′ = wMS\{i} mod N,
v′i = vi
M ′S,i mod pi,
zi = yiM
′
S,i mod mi.
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Each user i ∈ S first computes
W = w′r mod N,
G = gi
r mod pi
where r ∈R {0, . . . , 2L(mi)+2L1}. Then he computes the proof as
σi = h(w
′, gi, si, v′i,W,G),
Di = r + σizi ∈ Z
and sends the proof (σi, Di) along with the partial signature si.
• Verifying the proof of correctness: The proof (σi, Di) for the ith user can
be verified by checking
σi
?
= h(w′, gi, si, v′i, w
′Disi−σi mod N, giDiv′i
−σi mod pi). (5.8)
Note that the above scheme can also be used to obtain a robust threshold RSA
decryption scheme. Since RSA signature and decryption functions are mostly
identical, we omit the details.
5.3.1.1 Security Analysis
Here we will prove that the proposed threshold RSA signature scheme is se-
cure (i.e. existentially non-forgeable against an adaptive chosen message attack),
provided that the RSA problem is intractable (i.e. RSA function is a one-way
trapdoor function [18]). We assume the same static adversary model of Chapter 3
where the adversary controls exactly t−1 users and chooses them at the beginning
of the attack. In this model, the adversary obtains all secret information of the
corrupted users and the public parameters of the cryptosystem. She can control
the actions of the corrupted users, ask for partial signatures of the messages of
her choice, but she cannot corrupt another user in the course of an attack, i.e.,
the adversary is static in that sense.
First we will analyze the proof of correctness. For generating and verifying
the proof of correctness, the following properties holds:
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• Completeness: If the ith user is honest then the proof succeeds since
w′Disi−σi = w′
r
mod N,
gi
Div′i
−σi = gir mod pi.
• Soundness: To prove the soundness, we will use a lemma by
Poupard and Stern [61] which states that if the prover knows
(a, b, σ, σ′, D,D′) such that aDbσ ≡ aD′bσ′ (mod K) for an integer K, then
he knows the discrete logarithm of b in base a unless he knows the factor-
ization of K.
Let us define Ψ : Z∗Npi → Z∗N × Z∗pi be the CRT isomorphism, i.e., x →
(x mod N, x mod pi) for x ∈ Z∗Npi . Note that gcd(N, pi) = 1. Let g =
Ψ−1(w′, gi), v = Ψ−1(si, v′i) and τ = Ψ
−1(W,G). Given W and G, if the ith
user can compute valid proofs (σ,D) and (σ′, D′) then we have
τ = gDvσ mod Npi = g
D′vσ
′
mod Npi
and according to the lemma above, the ith user knows ui unless he can com-
pletely factor Npi. Since the factorization of N is secret we can say that if
the proof is a valid proof then the discrete logarithms are equal in modmi
and the prover knows this discrete logarithm. Hence, an adversary cannot
impersonate a user without knowing his share. Similar to Boudot and Tre-
ore [11], a range check on Di might be necessary while verifying the proof
of correctness to detect incorrect partial signatures from users with valid
shares.
• Zero-Knowledge Simulatability: To prove the zero-knowledge simulatability,
we will use the random oracle model for the hash function h and construct
a simple simulator. When an uncorrupted user wants to create a proof
(σi, Di) for a message w and partial signature si, the simulator returns
σi ∈R {0, . . . , 2L1 − 1}
and
Di ∈R {0, . . . , 2L(mi)+2L1 − 1}
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and sets the value of the oracle at
(w′, gi, si, v′i, w
′Disi−σi mod N, giDiv′i
−σi mod pi)
as σi. Note that, the value of the random oracle is not defined at this point
but with negligible probability. When a corrupted user queries the oracle,
if the value of the oracle was already set the simulator returns that value
otherwise it returns a random one. It is obvious that the distribution of
the output of the simulator is statistically indistinguishable from the real
output.
To reduce the security of the proposed threshold RSA signature scheme to the
security of the standard RSA signature scheme, the following proof constructs
another simulator.
Theorem 5.3.1. Given that the standard RSA signature scheme is secure, the
threshold RSA signature scheme is robust and secure under the static adversary
model.
Proof. To reduce the problem of breaking the standard RSA signature scheme to
breaking the proposed threshold scheme, we will simulate the threshold protocol
with no information on the secret where the output of the simulator is indis-
tinguishable from the adversary’s point of view. Afterwards, we will show that
the secrecy of the private key d is not disrupted by the values obtained by the
adversary. Thus, if the threshold RSA scheme is not secure, i.e., an adversary
who controls t−1 users can forge signatures in the threshold scheme, one can use
this simulator to forge a signature in the standard RSA scheme.
The simulator’s actions are as same as the the one described in the proof
of Theorem 3.1.1 which is used to prove the security of the underlying CRT-
based threshold RSA scheme. In addition to that, the simulator computes the
public verification data of the users in S ′ as vj = gyj mod pj for j ∈ S ′. For
other users i /∈ S ′, the simulator chooses a random integer yi ∈R Zmi and sets
vi = g
yi mod pi. Note that gcd(N, pi) = 1. So the public verification data
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generated by the simulator are computationally indistinguishable from the real
ones.
Consequently, the output of the simulator is indistinguishable from a real
instance from the adversary’s point of view, and hence the simulator can be used
to forge a signature in the standard RSA scheme if the threshold RSA scheme
can be broken.
5.3.2 Robustness in Other CRT-based Threshold Schemes
The robustness extension given in Section 5.3.1 can be applied to other CRT-
based threshold schemes as well. Here we describe how to adapt the extension to
the CRT-based threshold Paillier and ElGamal function sharing schemes.
5.3.2.1 Robust Sharing of the Paillier Decryption Function
As described in Section 3.2.2, Paillier’s probabilistic cryptosystem [57] is a mem-
ber of a different class of cryptosystems where the message is used in the exponent
of the encryption operation. The robustness extension can be applied to the Pail-
lier cryptosystem as follows:
• Setup: Let N = pq be the product of two large primes and λ = lcm(p −
1, q−1). Use Asmuth-Bloom SSS for sharing λ with m0 = φ(N2) = Nφ(N).
Let gi ∈ Z∗pi be an element with order mi in Z∗pi . Broadcast the public
verification data gi and
vi = g
yi
i mod pi
for each user i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
• Generating the proof of correctness : Let h : {0, 1}∗ → {0, . . . , 2L1 − 1} be a
hash function where L1 is another security parameter. Let
c′ = cMS\{i} mod N2,
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v′i = vi
M ′S,i mod pi,
zi = yiM
′
S,i mod mi.
Each user i ∈ S first computes
W = c′r mod N2,
G = gi
r mod pi
where r ∈R {0, . . . , 2L(mi)+2L1}. Then he computes the proof as
σi = h(c
′, gi, si, v′i,W,G),
Di = r + σizi ∈ Z
and sends the proof (σi, Di) along with the partial decryption si.
• Verifying the proof of correctness: The proof (σi, Di) for the ith user can
be verified by checking
σi
?
= h(c′, gi, si, v′i, c
′Disi−σi mod N, giDiv′i
−σi mod pi). (5.9)
If the ith user is honest then the proof succeeds since c′Disi−σi = c′
r mod N2
and gi
Div′i
−σi = gir mod pi. The soundness property can be proved with a proof
similar to the proof of Theorem 1. Note that gcd(N2, pi) = 1 for all users and
φ(N2) = Nφ(N) is secret. A similar proof can be given for the zero knowledge
simulatability as the one in Section 5.3.1.1.
5.3.2.2 Robust Sharing of the ElGamal Decryption Function
Adapting our robustness extension to the threshold ElGamal scheme given in
Chapter 3.1 is slightly more complicated than it is for the Paillier’s cryptosystem,
because φ(p) = p − 1 is public. A simple solution for this problem is to extend
the modulus to N = pq where p = 2p′+ 1 and q = 2q′+ 1 are safe primes. There
exist versions of the ElGamal encryption scheme in the literature with a composite
modulus instead of p. For example, Wei et al. [72] modified the standard ElGamal
scheme to obtain a hidden-order ElGamal scheme. They proved that their scheme
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is as secure as each of the standard RSA and ElGamal cryptosystems. Here, we
give the description of a robust, CRT-based threshold scheme for Wei et al.’s
version of the ElGamal encryption.
• Setup: In the ElGamal setup phase, choose p = 2p′ + 1 and q = 2q′ + 1 be
large primes such that p′ and q′ are also prime numbers. Let N = pq and
let gp and gq be generators of Z∗p and Z∗q, respectively. Choose αp ∈R Z∗p and
αq ∈R Z∗q such that gcd(p− 1, q − 1) | (αp − αq). The secret key α ∈ Zλ(N)
is the unique solution of the congruence system
α ≡ αp (mod p− 1),
α ≡ αq (mod q − 1)
where λ(N) = 2p′q′ is the Carmichael number of N . Similarly, the public
key β ∈ ZN is the unique solution of congruence system
β ≡ gpαp (mod p),
β ≡ gqαq (mod q).
Let g be the unique solution of the congruence system
g ≡ gp (mod p),
g ≡ gq (mod q)
and α and (β, g,N) be the private and the public keys, respectively. Note
that β = gα mod N . Use Asmuth-Bloom SSS for sharing the private key α
with m0 = 2p
′q′. Let gi ∈ Z∗pi be an element with order mi in Z∗pi . Broadcast
the public verification data gi and vi = g
yi
i mod pi for each user i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
• Encryption: Given a message w ∈ ZN , the ciphertext c = (c1, c2) is com-
puted as
c1 = g
k mod N,
c2 = β
kw mod N
where k is a random integer from {1, . . . , N − 1}.
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• Decryption: Let (c1, c2) be the ciphertext to be decrypted where c1 =
gk mod N for some k ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1} and c2 = βkw mod N where w
is the message. The coalition S of t users wants to obtain the message
w = sc2 mod N for the decryptor s = (c
α
1 )
−1 mod N .
– Generating the partial results : Each user i ∈ S computes
ui = yiM
′
S,iMS\{i} mod MS, (5.10)
si = c1
−ui mod N,
βi = g
ui mod N. (5.11)
– Generating the proof of correctness : Let h : {0, 1}∗ → {0, . . . , 2L1 − 1}
be a hash function where L1 is another security parameter. Let
c′1 = c1
MS\{i} mod N,
v′i = vi
M ′S,i mod pi,
zi = yiM
′
S,i mod mi.
Each user i ∈ S first computes
W = c′1
r
mod N,
G = gi
r mod pi
where r ∈R {0, . . . , 2L(mi)+2L1}. Then he computes the proof as
σi = h(c
′
1, gi, si, v
′
i,W,G),
Di = r + σizi ∈ Z
and sends the proof (σi, Di) along with si.
– Verifying the proof of correctness: The proof (σi, Di) for the ith user
can be verified by checking
σi
?
= h(c′1, gi, si, v
′
i, c
′
1
Disi
−σi mod N, giDiv′i
−σi mod pi).
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– Combining the partial results : The incomplete decryptor s is obtained
by combining the si values
s =
∏
i∈S
si mod N.
– Correction: The βi values will be used to find the exponent which will
be used to correct the incomplete decryptor. Compute the incomplete
public key β as
β =
∏
i∈S
βi mod N. (5.12)
Let κs = c1
MS mod N and κβ = g
−MS mod N be the correctors for s
and β, respectively. The corrector exponent δ is obtained by trying
βκjβ
?≡ β (mod N) (5.13)
for 0 ≤ j < t.
– Extracting the message: Compute the message w as
s = sκs
δ mod N,
w = sc2 mod N.
where δ denotes the value of j that satisfies (5.13).
As in the case of RSA, the decryptor s is incomplete since we need to obtain
y =
∑
i∈S ui mod MS as the exponent of c
−1
1 . Once this is achieved, (c
−1
1 )
y ≡
(c−11 )
α (mod N) since y = α + 2Ap′q′ for some A.
When the equality in (5.13) holds we know that β = gα mod N is the correct
public key. This equality must hold for one j value, denoted by δ, in the given
interval since the ui values in (5.10) and (5.11) are first reduced modulo MS. So,
combining t of them will give α+ am0 + δMS in the exponent in (5.12) for some
δ ≤ t− 1. Thus in (5.12), we obtained
β = gα+am0+δMS mod N ≡ gα+δMS = βgδMS = βκ−δβ (mod N)
and for j = δ equality must hold. Actually, in (5.12) and (5.13), our purpose is
not to compute the public key since it is already known. We want to find the
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corrector exponent δ in order to obtain s, which is equal to the one used to obtain
β. This equality can be seen as follows:
s ≡ c1−α = β−r
=
(
g−(α+(δ−δ)MS)
)r
= c1
−(α+am0+δMS) (c1MS)δ = sκsδ (mod N)
If the ith user is honest then the proof succeeds since c′1
Disi
−σi = c′1
r mod N
and gi
Div′i
−σi = gir mod pi. The soundness property can be proved with a proof
similar to the one in Section 5.3.1.1. Note that gcd(N, pi) = 1 for all users and
λ(N) = 2p′q′ is secret. A similar proof can be given for the zero knowledge
simulatability as the one in Section 5.3.1.1. We omit the security proof here
since the structure of the simulator is very similar to the one in Theorem 1 of
Section 5.3.1.1.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this thesis, we proposed CRT-based secret and function sharing schemes.
Regarding the secret sharing problem, we proposed verifiable and proactive
secret sharing schemes based on the CRT. We also showed how to modify the
Asmuth-Bloom SSS to use it for various problems. We proved that these modifi-
cations do not disrupt the perfectness of the scheme.
Regarding the function sharing problem, robust sharing of the RSA signa-
ture/encryption, the ElGamal and Paillier decryption and the DSS signature
functions with the Asmuth-Bloom SSS are investigated. Previous solutions for
sharing these functions were traditionally based on the Shamir’s and Blakley’s
SSSs [21, 22, 23, 29, 34, 50, 66, 68]. To the best of our knowledge, the schemes
described in this thesis are the first secure FSSs that use the Asmuth-Bloom SSS.
For some cases, the users have some private data y1, y2, · · · , yn and they want
to compute the value of a public function without revealing their private data.
Secure multiparty computation (MPC) deals with this problem. This problem
was first proposed by Yao [73]. In his paper, he proposed the millionaire problem
in which Alice and Bob are two millionaires who want to find out which one
is richer without revealing their wealth. The solutions proposed for the MPC
problem are usually based on the secret sharing schemes, mostly on Shamir’s SSS.
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Using CRT-based SSSs for MPC schemes can be investigated as future research.
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